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This study

is

an attempt

to evaluate th.e role played by topoe;ra:p�

in the results of the ca.nrpaign 1n West and Middle Tennessee during the

f:i.rst year of t,he Wa;r Between the
America, roads
of.' tbe

were

tele{;ra:::Jh

poor and comrmmication

was

ln

States.

mid-nineteenth century

was extremely

not yet widespread; mountains

and

slow.

The use

rivers still

presented formidable barr·Lrs t o travel, "JJ1d the chief i1lSans of movenent for troops YJas

by railroad, s te ambo at ,

horseback, ar:d on foot.

As the main scarce for primary materials for this thesis I ha:ve
relied on the ....
War ..,._ of
the Rebellion, A
Com;1ilation of
the Official
-- .......
...
- - ___.......

Records of tbe Un:l.on and Confederate Armies.
....;...
..;..
..;;;.;
.;.;...
;.;.. ..;..;_
;.
....;.. - - ....;.;,...;.
.
;...
..
---....;
_..._..........

'l'he Atlas 1:Yhich accom:Hmies

these records has aleo been invaluable for :1aterial relating to troop
movenents and positions as well as for ase as a source for portions of

the maps included in this project.
It

is hoped tl:.at

the ma)s will aid the reader in understanding

the to�;ography of too localities ·with which the

study

is concerned.

The maps are not drawn to scale but are 'J.sed t o show troop moveroonts in
respect to prominon:t relief feat�J.res and politicaJ. boundaries.

1

am

deeply indebted

s1.ty oi' Tennessee

to Doctor StanlEr.f J. fo lms be e of the Univer-

History Department, who sucL:ested the

s ub je ct

of this

thesis and provided ins,)ira:t.ion and guidance during its preparation.

would also liloo to ex;,;Jress r:tr appreciation to Doctor Eruph w. Haskins
and Doctor H. c. Amick, whose painstakine exa:G".ination and
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The

attack on Fort

Sumter in connection wi t.h the seces::.ion o£ the

various states which comprised the Confederacy 1 began the gigantic
struggle which was
of Ar.dericans.

to

last four years and claim the lives o.f thousands

The great experinent in democracy was threatened

dissension of a part of the Union's mmber states.

by the

Vll:wn armed conflict

appeared imminent , the Confederacy claimed it would fit7)1t only i.f federal.

troops threatened her territory.

Im,i:ediately, it became evident that

the North would not see the Union dissolved without a strmwla J the hope
of sone people for peaceful secession was only wishful thinking.

The

call8 to arms were issued by and for Federals and C onfederates alike.

Those calla were arumered by "Johnz:w Reba" and "Billy Ya.nks" in great
numbers.

1'he Confederate States of America organized their military

forces as best they could, w ith ll1&q,V valiant men resigning positions in

the United States Arl'l\Y to fight in the interest of their homes and

The Union Arnw 1 while already organized and p odsessing

states.

a.

wealth

of o:f the tradition of victory, was certainly in no condition to oppose
as

formidable a foe as its southern counterpart later came to be.

Thus,

great preparations were made by both s i des in the months irrrmediately

followi

ng

the organization of the provisional government of the Confederate

States of Arne rica in February,

1861.

'l'he Confederacy was faced wit h the defense of a frontier which

stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the western extrenes of Arkansas.
This pr ovide d for a de fens e lim upwards of

1200

miles long.

In order

to

2
subdue the rebellion, the Union

force s

in turn faced with tb.e neces....

were

sity of brea.ldng the Confederate defense line and inv ading the South.

For

both sides, there was also the di.ffic-1.1lty involved of

cros s i ng the border

st ates of Ma_r..rla.nd, Delaware, Kentucl<;t, and Missouri.

These s ta.tes were

in marzy- Ylqs friendly to the Confederate caus e but refused to secede !rom
the Union,. even though tradition and economy linked them to the se ce de d
They 18\Y' like a wide belt of "no man •s land" between the two

states.

gladiat<rs.

To add to this involved situation, the Confederacy was divided

into three se parate

parts by two

outstanding topographic features.

more .formidable of these was the Blue Ridge

The

Mountains which in th at dq

defied effective communications and divided the South distinctly into
east and

west.

Later

it might be sa.id1 'With

in many re spects two separate
time.

ware

some truth, that there were

in progress in the South at the sa.'Jle

f'urthermore, the west was again divided rut by a somewhat less

formidable barrier, the Mississippi River.

The nor the rn border of the

C onfederacy was not clearly established for several
vi s ional. government was organized.

months after the pro

This was soon reil'ledied in the east

l:zy" the secession of Virginia, vlhich in turn provided the Potomac
as a natural and

Rh-er

clearly defined boundary, but until Mq, 1861, when

Arkansas seceded and Tenressee formed a. military league vdth t."le Confed
eracy, the northern boundaries of

Louisiana., Mississippi, Alabama, and

Georgia formed the extent of the Confederacy.
The fact that Kentucky and Missouri did not join the Confederacy
caused the loss of such a natural boundar.r as the Ohio and Upper

tississipp1 Rivers.

As the war

prof,ressed it became more and more

app arent that the Co nfe der acy ' s weakest point was its left flank, and

the

eventual downfall
Credit for

Confederate

ranl<3.

selecting

line is

beginning of the

of the Confederacy was tl:"Jfl turninG of

usually

war he

for attack that

flank.

portion of the

vu.lrerable

At the

given to General Winfield. Scott.

was the most experienced officer in the Union

.ltlthough he was advanced in age and was later replaced, :h.e con-

ceived the

idea

Valley by fo rce

of a Federal occupation of the entire Mississippi

thereby splitting the

C o nfe deracy in

pla.:n:ood to halt and

accomplishing this, he

hal!.l

as the Anaconcla. plan.

the

V•hile it was

After

wait for Union sentiment in

the South to force that gov ernment to sue for pea.c..-e.

vided

that

never followed

This

as

was known

pla.n."led_, it pro

b as is for the over.Ul Federal strategy in the

west.2

The topography of the states of Kentucky and Tennessee are
in ma<"''lY ways •
long and

Both present

comparatively'

a wide variety

narrow

of surface features and are

from cast to west.

The Appalachian Houn-

tains form the eastern extent and highest elevations of both.
west of these mountains

the lower ridges and foothills

These serve to isolate East Tennessee somel'lha.t, and at

Civil

War presented

a

are

traversed by high

are in

and narrow

or

passes

Plateau

as

To the

evidence.

the time

formidable barrier to communication.

ranges, the Cu.mberland Mountain Hange

similar

of the

Tnese lower

i t is o.t"ten

called1

in the vicinity of the East

�� 2£.

the Rebellion: !.. Compilation 2f. the ?f£icial Recorda
annoitl'e<Ierate Arnues, 76 vo!S. (vra9iungtonl rkiver:nment
ol'l'ice1 188U:i9C51), §iries 11 Vol. 511 369-370.; Cited here

of the Union

Printing

after as Official Records.

1952),

2T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His
--

16-18.

Generals (New

York:

Knopf1

4
Tennessee

and Y�ntuc!\Y state line.,

West of this there

lower plateau. remnant, the Highland Rim,

is

a.

somewhat

which completely encircles t.he

This basin is a fertile agricultur

rich .Naslwille Ba.sin in Tennessee.

al region and forms the hinter-land for NashYille 1 Tennessee •
traversed from east to west b'J the

Olmberland River.

It is

To the north in

Ken"tacky the surface is roll int, and undulating in the now fatn<:r-.15 blue
gras::: area, 3.::3 it slopes northward. toward the Ohio Liver.

Htvor follO'Ws it.D

narrow

v<llloy nCJ:rtln;<3J:'d1 crossing both T:.,.rlT;ossec a..'J.d

Kentucky on its western course to the Ohio.
n.a..rrovt

The Tennessee

On either side of its

flood plain, -'�he terrain brea:ks away r&ther

east toward the Western Highl,:,u1d Idm ru:�d on the

abru.ptly 1 on the

lli'est towm·d ·the

nearby

Divide of West Te:·messee which :;ep3.l"ates the drainage to the Tennessee
from that t,r.J the Mississi�}pi.

1'1J.e ru:ea alon£; these 'banks is :,ome\vhat.

rugged and covered with. scru.b growth.

West

of tiest Tennessee 1 part of the Gulf' Coastal

all of 1'\.�st 'l'ennessee and Vfestern Kentucey.
or hilly in

:r.o s t

Plain.

111is covers almost

It is either gently rolling

This area is the Nost level land in

places •

and has alw�s been the

of the Divlde is the Slope

center of cott,on

Tennessee

culture in the s"tiate.

Here

between the Tennessee and .:..lississippi Hivers secession sentimrmt woo
very strong in 'l'ermessee.
Ex<1.'11.ination of a map of the Dout.�-centra.l section of' the United
Sta:tes will dJ.OTT the ir:.:.:;or�,rmce o:f tho rliror systems
transportation from the north,

wh:.ch provide €HMJY'

particularly into the states of N3ntucey,

'i'em".lessee, U'l!ssissippi, and Alabama.

These rivers had been used as

means of conveyance since the earliest

pioneer dS([s in t..'he West.

a.

The

-

-------

era of the s teamboat was at its helght in the decades preceding the
Civil

War� and in 1861, the rivers constituted ��e major arteries of

tra."'l.sportation in their respecM.ve states.
were

virtual

The 1'ormes:.:;ee and Cumberland

highWk\VS from the Ohio into the very

fro:n. north. to south whiclt

co�l()teJ�r

heart of Tennessee,

Thus 1

bis�cted the Confederacy.

the com11andinr, military- positions in the west were on or near these

rivers.

Both opposine arr.rles

strater,ic sites.

Vlere

quick to avail themselves of t..l-:tese

The professed mutrality of

Kentucky

held up the occu-

pation of some of these points for a ti.-rne; however, as soon as
evident

that Kentucky

was

gcinr; to remain in

for choice military :positions.

it becMJS

the Union, the scramble

was

F'arly in September, 18611 Federal troops

occupied Louisville and M:aysville, Kentucky.

!'hey were already estab-

lished at Ca..iro, Illinois, and soon afterward, Brigadier General

UJ,.ys�es

s. Grar t, who sought to occu:ny Cohunbus, Kentuclcy-1 on the Mississippi
River.- was th:warted in this plan by the occupation

of that

Coni'ederate force under Major C'-.eT�.eral Ie .,nidas Pollr.

te"aber 4,

place by a

Instead, on Sep•

Grant OCC1!pied Paducah at the mouth cf the Tel"..nessee River,

Thus 1 vd th the Federals in

poscesr:ions of

an.d Tennessee Rivers and with

an attack

the mouths oi' t:r.e Camberland

ir:mrl.nent,

it became necessary

for the Confederates to form a line in preparation for

def'ense.3

On Septe:nber 10, Albert Sidney Johnston was assigned the command

1941) J

.3sta.nley 1'-.•
l�4-h5.

Horn, .!!!!t � 2£

Tennessee (New Yorka

Bobbs Merrill,

on

6
of Depa:r-t:lEmt lhm.ber 'l'wo, w�_,:l.ch comprised the

states of TeP.mssee and

Ark&'1.Saa and, in ad.d.itim11 north Mississip :.•i and the ::1ilitary operations
in Kentuclcy-, Missouri, !Causae, and the Indian countcy immdiately west
of Missouri and Arkansas.

Johnston was accorded tho rank of General.;

highest in the Confederate Arn.w,

� it beca�IB his task to prepare the

Confederate line of defense in the West. 4

natural order.

This line fell into a rather

On his wey -west from Richmond, Johnston

ville and ordered General

Felix K.

Zollicoffer, Confederate commander

in East Tennessee with a force of some .3000 to
berland Gap.

stop::;ed in Knox-

4000

r:10n1 to occupy Cum-

Upon h:i.s arrival in Na.shvine, Johnston coJm:lissiomd

as

Drigadier General, s. B. Bucl:ncr, who had resigned his post a.s COT:1":l.a...id.er

of the

Kentucky State guard in order to serve the Con.federaC'J 1 sending

him to occupy Bowline Green,

Kontacky.5

Work had a.J..reacy oocun on

J?orts Herx.r.r and Donelson on t):le 'l'enn:::scee and Cumberlarrl Rivers 1 and
previou.s:zy :mntioned, the Conf'odsrates had occupied

Columbus on

as

the

!Iississippi River.
The belated movement into Kentucky c ost the Confederates the
possession of aey natural barrier along

which t:f::ey micht have arrajyed

The Ohio River would have provided such a barrier, 'tr...t t

their defense.

the Federal occupation of Paducah and LO'u.isville on the soJ.th bank of
the river :nade its use impossible.
fellding a frontic; r of more than

4wi1Lam.

Johnston

(New

400

'lbus, JohP..ston was faced wl th d.e

miles with a poorly equipped arnw,

Preston Johnston! Th.e Lifo of General Albert
York: Ap�)loton, lo7'81'; 29�. -

Sidnel

which never numbered many more

tJ:o..an

401000 men

forces numbering approximately 10,000.

7

opp ose d to F'edera.l.

a.s

His line stretched from

Cumber

land Ford near the Virginia line in eastern Kentucl:y- to Columb-..t s1

Kentucey, on

the east bank of

the Mississippi with Bowling Green the

center and salient of the line.
Johnston 1s forces were actually separated into three distinct
armies.

Polk held the left flank at Columbus 'lvith aboat 101000 man.

Yiith Johnston's aid, Colambus was s oon

earthworks v1ere erected, and Columbus
order to
was

command

virt..Ially

an

placed in

A2

early

impregnable position and its loss

evacu.ation Catlsed by the later flanking movements
on the Cumberland and Tenressee Rivers.

good state of def'ense.

arr:l.ed with long range gans in

W;:.tS

the Mississippi River.

a

as

Noveml10r1 1861,
due

was

it

only to

of the l''edara.l arnzy-

Its position

was

further

strengthened �J the construction of river defenses at Island Number Ten,

New 1,1adrid1 and Fort Pillow, all on tf!e
'

bus..

Mississippi River below Colum

The center was commanded by Major General

headquarters was at Bowlit1g Green, in the heart

William J. Hardee whose
of the Kentucey Blue

By Janua:ry, 18621

Grass country of rolling hills and beautiful streat:lS.
his total force numbered

around

25,000.

Part

of these were

around }limfordvi1le in advance of Bowlj.ng Green.

thrown out

In the east Zolllcoffer

had approximately 3000 to 4000 r:1en gaard:i..nr; Cumberland Gap and the im
portant road junctions in the rugg;ed, mountainous terrain of southeast

Kentucky.

There were by this ti,'ll6 only skeleton garrisons in the incom

plete works at Forts Henry and lhnelson under Brigadier

Tilghman and two or

General

IJ.oyd

three regiroonte at Hopkinsville, Kentucky, between

Fort Donelson an.d Bcnvling Green.

Johnston

originally

had his head·

8
quarters

at Memphis, bJ. t reports of F'edera.l acti v-l t"'J in front

of Bowling

Green in ear�y October caused him to move to that place, 6

Of all

the Confederate defensive posi tio:ns ir. this line 1 Col1!mbt1s

was perhaps the

best pla.."1ned and exec:1.ted.

re..enforced wl th sandbacs and

surrounded the town of Coltunbus., which

most of the e:un

north of the

town.

eart.b:work defense

at p:rovcmting the

the Misr:.d..ssir1pi River.

inus of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
wit.h

was a..'"'!

was directed pri:narily

passage of l''ederal &'lmboats down

ccn:pletely

It

11:as

The

C'..ef'anse

tJ1e northern terra-

It consisted of fo·.1r reckru.bts

emplacerrJt:mts being in a.:r.d on a

high bl:J.f:f just

Ravin�a and ditches were c:mstructed ir.to

an

abatis

of felled trees with a series of connected. rifle :;)its some f:.l.ve and one

h� feet deep cor;J.:nand:i.ns t.t1e landward apprvaches to the defenses
the town.
the

Gu.ns com.:"ltand:Lng the r:iver were sit11a.ted

positions both landward and tO".va.rd the river

on the bluff •

were

and
All

placed on favor

able ground along corema:nding ridi::,"E!S or hills • 1
This pos:Ltion was further strengthened by the construction of
supporting defenses

llissouri.

ldver
In

below Coltlmb�s at Island. lJu.mber Ten and l;jey,

The island, situated in the bend of a. ·typical JJissis

Madrid,

ip5)i

r:teculder., was fortified and a.rrJed with fifteen guns in tl:.lree redo:1bts.

ad1.:i.ition to this, the Cop.fedsrates had sunk

a

boat

in t1:e channel in

6�... 61-62.
1!!!:'£. 2£ � H.ebellion, !!_

Cor::pilation

2£. �

Official Records

of the Union and Confederate Armies, Atlas, 2 vols. (Washingtonr

--

Government Printing

o. a. Atlas.
-

Office, 1895), 11

Plate

$.

Cited

hereafter

as

9
o;:Jstruct navi;;,ation er:d construeted

order to
ouJ.S

j:1st ll0l.otv ths obstruction.

"l"!a.s

on

the

s o;ti:.h

b:,�nk of i:.he r:l:ver •

t�1e tmrm of lkw 1!iadrid1 Hissouri.
fort cont<d.P.in� fourtl:1r:.m

2Lr and

placed similarly on eiti:.ter s.t.de of the fort.

These

Here 1 t'b.c Confe,Jeratcs cm:lStructed

of the same size

floa:Lin;:; battery of n:i.ne

T} e:r""' were <•.:too r.:.v6 redoubts, con-

ta.ining t1"1SI!ty guns 1 placed eom.t'P..ndin.;_;J.y

ooander al.'llost dl=.e nortJ.;, of it

a

2..

positions at Island liu.mber Ten and r-;ey; Maclrid servr_jd

as

support for the

adva.'"!ced base at Col:.2mbLts1 and after the evacuation of the latter, the;r

fell to the Union forces long after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson. 8
Fort Henry on the Tem:sssee River antl Fort
berlru.d �iiver ·t-Tere pre-d.esir,ned

as

the defense of Nashv::LJJ.o 1

r.1ost strategic Confederate cities.
't:.te

As it late.r t:1rned

key to the entire Confederate line.

tant ;,;oint in the Confederate
geographical
holds.

It

troops in

line.

It

they

of the
'tfte!'e

Yfas

located at ·i:,he a�)�Jro.xinate

center of ·t.he line ru:d sli�;htl�,r !oriiard of the other strong-

was

1861

here t.;at the [;reatest cor;centrativn of Cor.federat,e
in

the west

Green Iliver, a.r:d at
situated among

was

a junction

rnade.

'rhe tovm ltsel.f was a

for roads in the

valuable

Lou.isville 1 on the

area.

In

tmdition,

high hills wLich provided com:nanding postions for

8 Ibid. 1 Plate 10.
-

out1

one

'l'his ·will be dealt w:i.th •.nore

position, being on the railroad from Nashville to

was

Donelson on the Cmn-

it

10
troops.9
On the right flank in eastern Kentuc!cy- 1 Zollicofl:'er had advanced
beyond C:.'um.berla.nd Gap and oc,_::lpied
both the Jamestown

and Jaclr.sboro

a

pos:i.tion on it tLat would

roads,

Before doing this, tba ma"m-

tain l'Jass entrances into Tennesueo .,a,d been fortified.
was never a

p1·otect

'lhe

right fJ.a.nk

statL·nar; defense dar:! �-;: these ea:rly months but 1maverod

back and forth

..

as

the troops ?rore :.1ovod to craard t..he va:r::aus roads.

Several ski.""T'lishes we:re

fought. vli th tho I''ederal

forcer� c.mder Gemral

Geor;:e H. 'I'ho�:ta.S, and tbe C'J.L"'lination of activ-:L ty in tl :is

crushilli:: defeat of the Coni'edcrates at
19, 1862, in '\llhich Zollicoffer

was

area was the

Logan's Cros;� lio<1ds on January

ldlled.

lu'ter thin, the Confederate

defense line was at Cumberland Gap rum various other mountain passe�h10

In addition to these main clements of the Cox1fcderate line, tb.ere
1.verc

detach.rnen-t,s at v ar iou s

three :regiments

points acrose Ei:mtuc}cy'.

a.t Hopkinsville and

stationed at points along the line.

two

roon

'llo.ere

were

Thus 1 the

.A:mong tr.ese cava.l.r'<J leaders were
These

and Na:than Bedford For:rest.ll

Confedcr:::roo lire of defense

was

set.

It was poorly

man11ed by troops who were oftentimes ar;;13d only wit.� their shotg11ns
or other doroostic weapons.

9Johnston,

��

It a:-:1ounted to littl.D more tha.."l a

Johnston,

316-317.

l0norn1 .!!!! � 2.£ Tennessee,.,
llibid.) 62.
-

o:r

sane roving cava.lry detachments

who later played a great part in the war in the west.

were John H. !ii.crgan

tv.·o

66-70.

long
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LA.

�

f\..A.

PRINCIPAL QAIL.RclAl>5

� MOUNTAiNS

CoNF£DERATE LINE
OF "ll£FENSIVE OUTPoSTS

•

CITIES,

TowNS,�

M.t .. ITAI:tY

'

'PoSITIONS

u
liOJ'e

f&Torable cireuetanoees but tbinga being as they llleft1 ita looa

\ioa

was

governed b,y conditiona which an well e.Jtplained b.r Oeneral

lo!mst.on1s $0ll 8ftd 'biographer, l'l1ll1aa

Preston

JehMto:cu

lrl determining hil l.i.M ot operatiou 1 O.neral Johnaton
had to cOMic»r the pogapb;y of the U..aV. of wv, tbe
politioal com.plexticm ot t.b.e populat1oa1 and the strength ad
diape.eitioa ot these toroea oppoeed to h1JI. Each o£ tbele
oondit.iou 'AI ef eueh a ehN"acter as to pUt hilll at a &ad
Yantage." • .AI Ooluabwl and t.be Owaberlawt -...n� had be·
..- tl'.MI eztn!ld tiea ot tbe Confederate UDe b.r torte �
natural conditiona, 10 Bclrl.ing Cb!'$en1 l1Jrlnriae 1 be._ tba
a..U.nt••• •AriT po1nt in aclYanae ot lelrl.:l.nc Clreea
J
While BewlJ.ag Gnu itaelt, eitu.ate4 on t.bt tunp
1 rau
road and river, wu a pod poaitioa for defellduuibe 11M
wu not all that coulcl 'be wiebedJ it ran �<Mab 111 uatr1el14ll' or lukitwa:ra popu.l&tion, ant.\ it we.a piftooecl lv two_..,
riwn (the fetmeiJaft ucl Gwaberl.&D4) 'Whoee 1J.fathe wre in
the poet�easion of the
bl.tt eft17 ot.bar l.1Jae bacil equal
or aP"e&ter 41aadYan�s .
In ...., , ae el.lnhfte, w � .
taD thinp .. - fiDtl thea, ., u - WOlll4 1ul:ft tlJia.U

!f.:!! ••at•

•ntiO"J

During the latter 110ntha of 1861 and. tbr011pow.t J&lll8171 18611
eaeb. U'!IV vutq ovenetim&ted. the other.
t1nll' or a

preparatory

eruitiDC and
the

nature

cb'Uli.ng Miq

on

Act1v11f' wu aJ.aoat

both aidaa with acoelel"ated

CCIIIIDlOD

tbrcugh•t tbe

en

re

varica e..,. with

Federal prep&ratio.ne t• edvanoe al1d. the Ccmf'ederate for defeDM•

CH.U".t'EEt II

of

T1'.l6 portion ot the Con:tecffar&f&. JJ.m
kD7 to that

ent.ire

liM ftl

de£&1188 llhieh be..- �

eeleoted and situated

p&rti.e&nl t.ban b7 caleulat.i.ng erlgl.neers.

ure

by zea.l.ocla

.lt this tU. laahville ,....

west.

the aupp]l' depot of the Cozafederaey in tbe

It

wu

the lar&e8fr

and llOit impor\ar!t ei\"Y in thl Confederate wat W1.th tbe ezoeptloa ot
..., OJol.earMI .

I\-. also a center tor riwr, r&ilroa41 aDd t.urnpU..

tratno an4 by the
a

encl

l86l.

ot

ll'ltm1nt et nppliea euch

YUt.

wu
u

aupp:qins

the

Contederate .ln!f' w1tJt

percwssion oapa, sabers, UB�sk£rte1

saddles,. harness 1 lCDapaacka, uniforM 1 cannon, and rifled gruw •
eddition 1t became the storage point for to'Od and other aupplles •
location 011 the Owlberlencl Rivvr 1

1n

more

peaoetul U.e, made it

that quarter in time of...,...
'betore

Johmlton •• li.ne of

QowrllOJ" Isham o. Huria
of the

state, u wU

ae

on

Its

while helping the oit¥ to .tlGUriah

extreme]l'

'f\llnerable to attack tr•

lmmed.iate]l' alter Tennessee •cede<l an4

defense

had

awn

beg1ut to take

shape 1

ot 'le!U16asee realized the danger of inv'uion
the oontributiOlla t.t>

thU danger made by the

�nee ot the 'feumeaee ud. Cl.Dlberlan4 Biftra
to the heart of

In

the Sou1b.

ln ..,.. he

aa

i.nviting

patb:lnv'a

ordend that to:rtl be coDetnlct.d.

tbe riftra tor the dlltenee of the ata'ta, Uld

oommilaioned. GeDJral

Daniel s. Domlaon1 a West hint gt'aduate, to imeatigate the area anc1
aeleot the beat poesible a11N tor such torte.l

In
limits

thia selection of

sites,

it

was

neoetssa.ty to mmnin within the

ot Termessee beeau.ae ot the profe•s•d nent'ralit,. of Kentu.ek;r,

Which wu l'10t
stat& in

violated until Oontederate troops wre JIO"'ed into that

m:i..S..S.ptember. Also1

it

wu

desinld

that the forts be placed

u far d.OWDGtftM from lashvillAt u possible 1n order tA provide u:d.
lt!WI

protection. tJpO'Jl

that

a

high

blntf'

em

examination of the «nta, General Doaelson reported.

the

was the best spot on the
no

good pl.-oe for

a

west bank a mila below Doft:r in Stnan County
Cwaberl.aa4.

He also reported

deteui'ft position

on

the

that there ••

tenne&:Jee within the

limit. of the at&te and. advised that a Bpot 'be oceu.pied several milea
north of the Kentucq state line.
th4t later

FQl"t Henry
lia.l:Till .

of t:Jowrnor

the riftr and

meted by

a

u

the

&

did, hOW'Ver, adopt the site o£

beat possible position in 'fenneasee

on

Dover wu sii'Aated tcrt.r miles from the mou.th ot

H'N�iw llilea f'rOil lubville 1 to which 1 t was

road.

order

1'he site aelsete<l

on

the

con

'l'enmssee wu OfllJr abou.t

•lw miles al.m.ost due wat of the propoeed site

on

the

Onmbarland.2

The t.wo petitions were connected by twe roads.)
It is

intensting to notice t..ltat there

aift potitione along the rivera in
Riwrs• about

lentu.eq.

were

several good deten

In the ViciniV � Orand

tort,' m.Uee bel• the adopted aitea, the Ownberland a.ncl

Te1meaaee now to withill two or three miles of each other • before

aepara:Ung

toward their

reepective mouths

on

the

tllio.

A defensive

on

work erected here

favorable terrain, vtlth well

outworks, cmtld have com_;]anded both rivers and

co..'11,:tunications •
lut.ed.

Hovrever, the

"Tho coverning

Tho c;:round
in

honor of

b11ilt

was

on

neu trali t:t

considerations

whicl-: thJ fort

mainta:i.,'10d

evidently pol:ttical, rather

rorred l'ort Henry

the 'l'enmssce,

Gustavus A. Henry, Confederate Senator from Tennes:::ee 1 was

only

a

few feet hiz,ber than the r:i.ver.5

the fort was

chosen hy Adna Anderson,

noer; it

selected with specific attention to

was

tho surveys, Anderson was

Stewart's chief engineer.
selected was

lihen

excenent

of F.$ ntu Cl\)," could not oo vio-

were

on

and

plam:ed rifle pits

a.'1

able tmd

jast op,;,osite the

'WideJ.vr knOl\n enei

hir;)1

marks,6

vmter

In

Foster, later C'10neral A. P.

assisted h'J Vl. F.

�hey began

T.ne f:irst site for

work on

moutJ'l of the

M� 101 and

the s:l.te they

Bir; Sandy Hiver.

L{ajor Bushrod H. Jolmson bec&mo chief eneineor

Later,

of tho Tennessee

troops on l� 281 he shifted the location of t.he site five miles dO\mstrea':l.

Tho

task of construction '!'Tat as:::;igned to Colone l A. Heiman

arld his reclm.ont., the lOth Tcnrossee .

'l'he

first (::Un

Because of its location on low ground, Uw fort
or

was

freshets, ciurint; wl1ich it
an

fort

was

allilost surrounded

acl:vantar;e ar;aJ nst land assault, it

and deprived it

4Johnston,

was

linited

Life of Johnston,

5Horn, � 2£

Tenressee,

..

76.

r:1ountcd in

liable to floods

l)y li'ater.

While this

In

addition, Fort

400.

�;J:'

6nro:n.t'ield lewis llidley 1 Battles and Sketches of the
Tenrsssee (Mexico; Missouri i'rinting a.nd""P,lbiishing 'UO. ;1'9
7Horn1

� !?£ Tenressee,

76.

July.7

activity vii thin the

of ar:y advantage of eJflvation.

--

waD

1

of

�.

Rem"Jf was commanded

b'-.t hig,h ground

on

While conatruction was going

fort

the CUmberland

011

was

the opposite side cf tbe

on

river. 8

at Fort lfe.nry• t.hc site for the

more or leas neglected.

It

was

na.;wd Fort

Donelson in honor ot Oe�al Donelson, who had selectod the eite.
Colonel R, W. McGavock with three 'l'ermeasec

Octol::ler1

sent to Dover.

However,

little

do1Je at

was

until Johnston bec.atm eomt,£nde;r· in the

a

"West.

.

1

In

companies was

construeti'V\9 11.atare1
Real:l.�i:r.z the vulnera.bll-

ity of that portion of 1'1le lim 1 he soueht to puah the fol"ta forward
to

completion. Lloyd !1l.ghma.n

and

of

Kent\lcq

was

made

a

Brigad;!.er Ger.lrsl

pl&oed in charge of botl1 torts, assumir.g conunand on llovem.bor l7/)
In September

L1eutena.nt Dixon of the Corps ot Enginest·s

\

He !'eport&d that the worb at Fc:rt

Hen1'7

'l'W:t'e

was i.n-

almost completed..

Al

though the tart wa not eituated at th$ moat fa.T<�trable spot, he &dvia$d
that in view o£ the

circurnstancea 1t should be oorupleted, rather tt�an

be diseontimted in favor ot the erection of
plaOih

worb at a

more

favorable

He proposed hO'Wever that fort:.il'icat1or.s be eo:nstructed anc1

garrisoned

on

the

high l.and ·which eom�&d t}ae fort from tile •st bank

of the 'tennesseE�.

By th.i& time, K'en'tA.l.etq·ts mutrallty

problem.

were

Meaentres

ela-ve ro:rce1 eQnt:ribiltA:td

nployed

in

In

a

wa.s no

longer

t.mn to ca:n:;r out these su�"(;!stiorlS• and

b;r p1a.nters

a ·

in Tet'lmssee and Alabama, waa

this underta.Kinc.
similar ixmtstigation ot fort. Denelson Otl the Oumberl.an41

6Jolmaton;

'aora,

!!!!. !!. J�to�, 409.

!!3t !! TelU'JU_,., 76•

a.

N

II
THE AREA BETWEEN
FORT DONELSON �
FORT HENRY
fh�l.-r
ReAl>

PiTS

\

(

I

I

I

'

I

16
llixon

aeain thought that a better position might have been

c arrie d to comple tion rather than be

b-11t that work thero should be

to a

moved
well

In

view of this 1

of rifle pits

fear:ed the results of

he mad3

and abatis

ing

done

partial.ly' by

for

defense

landward side .

against attack .fr om this

quarter .

the cons truction of these works, which was
slave labor •

of obstructions to navigation

below

an attack .from the

surveys for addi tiona.l outworks in the form

He remaine d to supervise
again

He considered the water defe nses

more advantage ous spot.

located bu t

selected,

In &ddition, he a.dvlsed the plac

in the

shoal water of the Cumberland

Donelson, and he als o supervised this project. lO
In September Governor Harris appointed Captain Jesse 1'a¥lor 1 a

trained

naval artillerist, to take c omma.nd of the guns at

TSirlor

was

fort .

He complained first to state authorities ,

was te

:Lmmediate)Jr i.rnpressed by the unfavorable position

of time , he was not

bus who refe rre d him
insecure

Fort

heede d, he turned

to Johnston.

Johnston,

and

Hen:cy-.

of the

v,rhen, after xn.ueh

to General Polk at Columever anxious

aLout

the

r:l.ver defenses 1 se nt his chief e ngineer 1 Major J . F. Gilmer 1

to inves tigate . ll

Gilmer arrived at the forts on January 311 1862 •

Speaking of

Fort Henry in his report, he termed it a 11strong .field work of fine

bastion front" and

stated

that

it was in a good state of defense with

;;eventean guns mounted on platforms 1

twelve of which

lOpolk to Johnston, April 11 1862 1
Johnston, 4lo-4ll .
llHorn, � 2£ Tennessee1 77-78 .

quoted in

could be brrugh.t

Johnston1 .!!!!!. �

17
to bear on the river �

These included one

cannon combini!lf:; the qu.a.lities

10-inch

of the long

Colum';iad, a heavy

ranr;e eun, howitzer , and

mortar, one 24-pound rif1ed gun, two 42-poundo rs , and ei@.t .32-pound
caronades , medium sized artillery pieces , all arran ,

lines

to fire between

He further s tated that there were ex-

embrasures .formed by sandbags .
te ns ive

ed

of infantry cover, cons tructed with a view to holding

com,;!anding ground.

He described these as " capable of offering a s trong

resis tance to a land a.ttaek. "

opposite the fort, which had

In addition, he considered the defenses
been na.med Fort Heim.an.- almost completed

and although no guns had been re ceived to be put in these works, the
infantry cover there made them defendable • 12

Concerning the defenses o n the Cumberland, Gilmer had exa..'lline d
them in November and, although he then thought
fifteen miles downs tream from Dove r ,

a better

Lineport,

Kentuclcy-,

position, advised that

under the circums tances it would be be tter to retain and strengthen
the pos ition, and that it was "sus ceptable to a good defe nse

At this

landward. "

time , there had been very little work done at Fort Donelson,

and Gilmer advised the construction of defenses "as rapicl:cy" as

poe sible . ul.)

From the time the s ites for the two forts were first selected
until e arly in January, 1862 1 work progressed very slowly.

to comple te the defenses seem to have ne t

Attempts

with a long string of hal.f..

12official P�cords , I, 7 , 131-132 .
13neport of Major J. 1*'. Gilmer, November ,31 18611 quoted in

Johnston, � .2£.

Johnston,

41.3 .

18
hearted efforts .

Moreover� there was always a shortage of troops to

garrison the forts as well as

to ma.n the trolns .

of c orn:petent artille ry o.f:ri cers and men

Cons tru ction was further

slowed by

a.

lack of labor .

lt has alreacy been mentione d that slave labor was used in the
both f orts .

Althou a::h

the

-work

on

officers in charge werE; au thorized to use

this source of labor extensively, the plan.ters and various other slave

O'Wr'.ers in the region were quite reluctant to have their s lave s used

in this manner.

There were various atte ,rpts to bri ng numerous slaves

from Northern Alabama and Miss i ssippi, but these usually resulted in
more ,?lana a:r.rl talk than actual labor.

A more adequate sup:.Jly c ould

have resulted in making Fort Henr.r at least defensible snd .Fort

son poesibl�{ impregnable .
respective surrender.

Ile i the r

was

Donel

comJle te d at the ti:ne of l ts

When Maj or Gilmer agai.n inspe cted the defenses

arot1.nd the first of l''ebru a.cy, he fotlnd them almos t comple te d .

Although

not as originally planned or of a permanent nature , they were co1apleted

in the best pos sible �anner considering the time and res our ces at hand.

Such thint;s as shelter for troops and supplies and adEH{11ate communica
tions syste:a.s had not been and were never
never arme d or fully garrisoned.

comple ted.

Fort Heiman was

It fell without a f ight,

thus

giving

the Federals a position on a hei cht corruaanding Fort Henry, althou gh
they did no t find it nece s s ary to use it .

These things were contribu

ting causes of the final surrender of the forts along vd th their

g.u.rris ons and s tore s .
¥11 1en , abot1t the fj.rs t of February, Gilmer pronounced the forts
defensible , they were jus t that and no more .

For t Henry

was an e arth

work of n.ve bastions placed in a slirrht bend of the Tennessee River 1

19
thus 'U:for d:Lng miles of

stru c bed
a

on a

low

:c ... se

vis:tbility downstream ard opport.tnity for direct

of c:cound1 whicL formed s om.ewhat of a sm:ri.-c:h·cla

for·e.l4

lH:.tle Wl:\fs back i'rom the

'Ihese outworl;:s _, tre nche s , arK!. rifle

pits extenriad as far as tvw m.iles back on the road f:.rom l-'ort

The for t

Dover ,

the

was

sit;uate d s o law tbat durine high ·water , )'Jhich 1vas

case at, the tiae oi' th.e attack,

fort from the outworks .
was

i�eru-y to

At the

a

sbeet of water separated the r:rain

tiH� of t.l:te atta.cl;:_, a _portion of the

under two feet of water , this be irF"
b al:m.os t

fort

up to ·Lte :�.m :>1atforrns .l5
�

•

have been a formidable obstacle to t.he li'ederal attack had they been
Tiley oc{..'Upied

completed, and [:,"Ul1S placed. thel'e •

ing courrtl7side .

a

bluff

high enough

Built at tbe sugr..;e s·tion of Dixon and with t;l1e

a.pproval

of Gilmer, these works wert: to have :mounted L'UnB lar�;;,--e cnoueh to be

effe ctive agains t gunboats and

the men

anl guns

...-

were

to Lave "been

protected by a series

;.th 1\'hich to defend the position did not arrive 'before

tlle position fell to the Federal troops .
At first, cons truct.ion work

favor of that at l<'ort He:nry .
the forts a;nd

arrived at Donelson in

l5UJ.ysses S ,.
I, 291.

Grant,

Fort Donels on was sacri.fice d in

V.hen 1'il.ghman

lls.Horn1 � 2£ 'I'ennessac1
1885-1886 ),

at

T<�as

assir.;ru:; d to com::aa.nd

mid-December, he fou. nd six undis-

81 .

Pers o:r.al 1femoirs , 2 vols .

(New

York t
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ciplined companies of inf'a.ntry 1

an unorganized

light battery1 and a

small water battery of two guns CO!llnaning the river to the north.
Places had been prepared for to:a ,32.pottnder gu.na1 but they had not been
reoeiwd.

Work

were no ou. ter

on

the fort bad been on:cy- partially completed, and there
From this time until tt:.

defenses of anr description,

forts wre attacked, preparations were carried on Ylith

potusibls .l.6

In contrast to Fort Heney, the site

aelec ted

Donels on was on high ground not liablB to !loods .

a high ridge in the
commanded the

On

much haste as

for Fcrt

'!'be main .fort occupied

o£ two water batterie s , which whe n comple ted

rear

rivur.

as

this ridge the fort was situated ab<llt

one

h11l'l-o

dred feet above the water1 thus providing a view several miles dawn
'l'he fort

stream.

was

located about

one

mile downstream fran the tom

ot Dover where the Confederate commis sary supplies were stored.
Donelson was

an

irre gu lar

fifteen acrea .l7
£iw
in

or

Fort

bastioned earthwork, which enclosed about

It was tormd by throwing up dirt to a heiabt of abolt

six feet and about eleven feet wide, thus leaving a sort o£ moat

front of the works which '01 some six feet deep and twl"Ve feet wide .
of the ridge or bluff' on the north

'l.'Ma ectbwork followed the summit

and wet, but toward the ealtheast, it e llClosed a deep
this quarter

was

the

ravine and in

ol'll:y e ntrance to the fort.l8

.Almost at tJ:...e top of' the bluff am at an angle between the fort
and the river, the upper water

l6w'.tt.ial

was

located.
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18

battery

Tennessee,

84.

0.-. k,a 1 At�1 I, Plate 11.

144 .

It mounted

a

32•

21
pound rifle d gun and two .32..,;pound caronade s .

about

ha.l.fw:ey down the

bluff and

smooth-bore 32-poundere .

imate]Jr

mounted one 10-inch Colum.bia.d and e i [tl t

'.!'he water batteries were earthworks

six feet in depth and

brasures of sandbags .19

'i'he lm•cr battery was

twenty feet in

width prote cted by em

For each of these two batteries 1 there was an

underground powder mana.gine .

20

When the site of the fort was fh'st selected, it

only for defense

from the water

s ide .

'l'he

was for the

most

eitl»r above or below.

a very marshy

just

s orrewhat

was

Creek

e ntered

Hickn>.a.n

desigr.ed

land

pri-

was very little
l'he position

from points on the river,

Creek, after pursuing its course

through

a.nd in times of high water impassable area, emptied into

the Cumberland

ation

1'here

to defense from the larrlward side .

part unapproachable by

was

fort itself was built

marily as field support for the Vfa.ter bat t.eries .

early thougilt given

of approx-

below, or north of,

duplicated

the riwr.

entered the river

just above

the water batteries .
or s outh

of

'l'his situ

Dover where Lick

Indian Creek followed its '\\"ide valley ard

about half Wa:(f 'between Dover and the fort.

At the

time of the battle , this serv-ed to separate the Confederate left and
right wings , virtua.l:cy- is olating the latter from the remainder of the

garrison.
When he made his inspection in :Jeftember , Lieutenant Dixon ad,..
vised

too corwtruction of add�i.tional fie ld works to

protect the fort

l9rbid. , r, Plate 11.

2 00ne of these magazines

t: ,e p:ceserJ.t time .

The w tli::r:o

has been restored and l71Bi'f be
o.f the c tl!er i.e din cernible .

seen at

22
He planned and supervised the constru ction of

from landward attack.

line

a

rifle pits about two and one half miles long1 varying from one

of

fourth to three-fourths of a mile in distance from the river .
shortage of labor and

the delaq whi ch characterized the preparations

for defense cause d the se

tizn.e of the battle .
gether and placed

defenses to remain incom;�lete 1 even at the

These breastworks

end to end

protection, although

The

consisted of logs rolled to-

and covered with

insufficient

dirt.

This

provided some

artillery and only a

agai ns t fie ld

reasonable protection against infantry attack. 2 1

These breastworks

ab ou t four fee t high with a two foot trench on both side s of the

l!lerc

barrier 1 thus forming a

T.!.1ey

were

protective

coru�ected and forme d

mass

one

approximately s ix fe et in height.

long trench .from

the extreme left1

southeast of Dover and be tween the town and the backwaters of Lick Creek,
to the point where

lines .
was

on

the broad valley

of Indi an Creek interse cted the

Here 1 they were discontimed and began again where the

resumed

on

the opposite side of the valley.

Artillery

was

ridge
placed

these commanding points , so that the entire gap in the lire a was
The continuous rifle pit

covered.

a

ridge north of Indian Creek to
main fort and across a

where the

ridge

quoted

point almos t directly

smaJ.l gap in the ridge .

overlooked the

na.rshy' backwaters

defenses consis ted of irregular
works were only

followed the forward crest

of the

soa thwest or the

F'rom he re to t11e place
of Hickman

and di s connected trenches .

Creek1 the
'l'hese breast-

partially completed at the time of the battle , and in-

1Re

2
port of Brigadier General s . B. Buckner ,
in Ridley 1 Batt.les .!!!£ ._
....
t...., c._
he
....s
..,.,
Ske
...

54.

february 18, 1862 1

2.3
stead of being connected

as

the others 1 they

rangi ng from twenty-five to forty feet in

were

length.

separate trenche s 1
It is inte re s t ing to

note that 1 while this unfinished portion of the works did not corf!.c::and
the main

approach

to

Dover and the for t , it

did c ommand ore approaching

road and was t.'le wing of the defense irnrnedia.tely before ti1e water
batteries and the �ain

lm.'"nediatel:y

fort.22

i n front of these rifle pits , tle r idge made a

steep descent to a series o£ almos t contimous ravines .

The s lope from

the rifle pits to the ravlnes was heavil,y wooded with oak and scrub

growth, ar.ICi the ridge varied in
aging about seventy-five

height from fifty to

feet. 2 3

e ighty feet aver

On the s l ope alonG the front of the se

outer defenses , the trees had been felled in order tLat their limbs
would point ootward toward an attacker .

The limbs of the trees had

been cle ared and s harpe ned, s o that they presented a
to a force attacking in mass formations .

of the ravi11es before

obstacle

Although not completed, thi$

abatis covered the entire front of the landward

opposite s ide

difficult

the rifle

defenses.24

On the

pits, rose another.

almost

parallel rldge along the cres t of which ran the 'tmn ' s Ferry Ro ad , which
was

of great strategical importance in the battle .

Spurs and various

other elevations along th�.s ridge later afforded cormnanding posi tions
for F'edera.l artillery • 2 5

222.!...•.!

Atlas,

Plate 11.
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24o.

R . Atlas ,

Plate 11.

25Johnston, � 2f.

Johnston, 440.

165.

24
The area

cut by

between the rifle pits

various irregular ravines

Indian Creek on its wq

to

area

oo defended

and the main f ort and Dover was

which branched off

at I<'ort Donelson.

the outer line aJ.ong the ridge 1

These ravines and consequent

they had

abatis similar to the one described.
federate communications and

troop

the Confederates fortified

been constructed into an

This later served to hinder Con-

movem nts between differe nt parts o£

J.ine . 2 6
While the Confederates were

Union

was

preparing to move

rivers .

thus

On

were

As

against them.

August 30, Captain Andrew H.

placed in charge of naval operations

boat�

preparing their defenses 1 the

early as Mey 11, 18611

taken to provide a fleet of gu.nboa'fs to

steps were

was

the valley o£

the Cu.mberland trll"ough the middl.e of the

to

ridges were also he avily wooded_. and before

the

from

oper ate

on western

Z.'oote of the United States Na.v;y
on

the we s tern waters .

1be

constructed wide and short, s o that they would draw a minimum

of water in the shallow

rivers .

Some of them. mounted as ma..ny as thir-

teen heavy guns and were plated w-lth iron.
the Ohio and Mississippi by early September .

These boats be gan cruising
By the middle of Ja.nu.ary,

1862 1 tlle Federal com:n.andera had developed the plan of' movi rJg against
the Confederate defense . line
Rivers .

This

seelTJed to

since Col:u.mbus and

strongly fortified.
force of

be

by wey of tm Cumberland arrl Tennessee

the most logical pla.ce for such

a moveroo nt.,

Bowlirtg Green on the left and r ight were much more
l�'rom

January 23 to 24,. General c .

F. Smith with a

l•'e deral troops made a re connaissance to Fort Henry.

A few long-

25
range shots we re exchanged between t he fort and the gunboats , but no
damage was done .

On ,Jcmu.ary 2 8 1 Grant and J:'oote at C<dro both te le-

gr�?hed Major General H. w. Eal..le ck, Federal c oramanci.er oi' the Department
of t'lle I/fiss our:t with headquarters at St . Lou.is , as kint; peruis::: ion to
•
.

move

a.ga:'Lnst .l.i'ort Ile:rrry..

On Februa.:r"'.f 2 Halle c k t,T cJ..nt ed this recr.lest and

authority to Grant , 27

gave full

Grant ' s plan of at.tack c.Ulod for a s i..-wJ.ltane ous land and water

ass ault on Fort Henry at

11 :00 A . U., on

so low th&t. the boats CO"!lld not pass, but with
lato January, they began to rise and

The

'l'r...c river had been

the coming of rains in

soon rose above

structions as well as natural hazards .

three dlvision.s.

6.

Febrtt ar-.r

the Confedt;rate ob-

Grant ' s troops -v.rere divided

:Firs t Division under Brigadier General J. A.

McC1erna.nd was to move from its poi..11t

of disembarkation on the e&t bank

to take positions on the roads bet"Ween Forts B£nl!'y and
preYenting re�n.forcements or

landed on the

He i'nan, opp oc ite Fort Henry .

lancled

(lti

woode n,

The S-econd Division

lYas

1'his division

was

thus

to t:e
Fort

c olJ.:::an(icd b:,· fu·icad.ier

The thi.rd ciivision under Grant hirasel.f

the c ast bank and

28
vnard s ida .

re·troat.

Donelson,

·west ba:rJt a...d
."1 t;::;.1::s and occupy the he::..£;hts ir:.clllding

General c . r . Smith .

into

wa.::;

to be

inveot <md a.sz au1t the fort from the land.-

The not.illa. cf se-.;,"en f:..'1mb oa.ts 1 fo:l!' armored and tZirec

was to rnove on the fort at 11 ;00 A . li�. , opcr.J..n c fi.ra at 1700

2 7 Ibid. 1 441..
-
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125.

26
yaz'ds dis tance ane clonint; to

6oo yards � 29

The Pirst Division was ferried up the river
dise;:�ba.rked accordi ng

on

?o'.Jrua..r".f 3

a.."ld

to plan at ltra LJJ1ding1 e ::.ght r:J.ile s below fort
la:nd

Henry.

'l';:_ s

so poor

tlli".lt they were for ced to reer11bark ::md J::l.illm a sec ond disembar�;:ation at

Ba:i.J.ey ts Landi ng, tlu--ee miles below

visions

were

tl'w fort.

'I'.he Second Division

Heav;y rain fell

pu.t in mo tion on the morniq:,; of the si}tth .

thrrughout. the night of the fifth, leaving the ground I!llld cy axu:l the
creeks swollen and fille d wi.th backwater ..

motion IY.r 11 :00 A . a. on the s:L"'{th.
fort

UcClernand to t his troops in

Althou.c;h

onl�r t.:.lJ.ree miles from the

by the r :: ver , the route ·which they were forced to ta.k�;?

country road::� :nea.Jured close t.o e2.gh t miles .

Only I':alf

over

back-

o.f this :had been

covel"t�d 1rhcm t;ho tro<Yps heard tile :s ou.nd of tho artillery cl!.te l botf:rec.n
the fort an.c� tl:te flotilla.

!lear'inc

a

report ·C}mt t.he Confederates were

evacu ating the fort, �!cCl(�rnaml r:w.de all pos .. ible has te , end his advanced.

cava.J.ry cGm1e upon trw ConfcHlorato ' s route of rc t:cc t:�.t jus t

a.s

!-,ba."1wh:Ue , tlill t.,"ltnboats unde:r Foote had attacl<ed the fort

as

due l from 12 :.30 until
in sur:render • .3l

1 �45

P. u. when the Confe d.erate bamJer

During ·this

29Ibid, , 123

•

.30Ibid.
, 126-l)O.
-

e ngagernent every gunboat

?las

was

lmvered

hit 1�

27
times , and the Essex was com_pletely disabled when a shot

hit

her boiler

and ex;1loded it,32

�Vl'...e n the

F'ederal gJ.nboats first tested the range of

guns o n February

4,

Fort

IIenry ' s

'l'il.gh:n.an, comnander oi'

Brigadier Gernral Lloyd H .

Confederate defenses on the Cumberland and Te nnes see , was inspecting last

minute work

ol'l

the fortifications at For t Donelson .

Upon he �xing heavy

firing, he , along with Colonel Gil..
>ll.er 1 Johnston ' s head engineer, who was
als o at Domls on,

"Want immediately

dq and the entire next dey"
attack.))

'n1..e remainder of that

Fort Henry,

spent in preparing for

The total garrison at fort Henry on t.h.e

given

as

Grant

numbered around

position.

-were

to

2734

n:en by 'l'ilghman

17 1000

in his

men . 35

report.3L.
Tilghman

eve

the

approaching

of the attack

is

1'he inves ting force under

realized his desperate

He had only eleven guns in the fort with which to face the

fifty-four guns of the s even gunboats .

There

was

in the fort and surrounding it on three sides .,

water two feet deep

All avenues of escape

were cut off' s ave one and it w·as threatened b'IJ the inves ting for ce .
Having only a small garrison hopelessly outnumbered, he decided t o allow

the garrison to e s cape to Fort Donelson, keeping only t he he avy artillery
con1pany to man the guns of the fort .

tho :retreat of the

32Grant."

main

In this manner, he sought to cover

c olumn until such a time as they should be safe-

Mem.oirs
, I1
'

292 -29.3 .
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34Ibid.
, 137 .
-

)$Grant,

Merao:i.rs , I,

288 .

7 1 1)) .

l;r a:wiiJ3",

Tilgh.man remained in the .fort serving at one of the �.u'lS to

re lieve t.he chief of th at �)ieee "

ha.vint only

l''inalJ.y , ju.st

l::.lefore two P. M.

the

J.:·our guns remaining in action and fe arful for

his neroic gun crews 1 he ordered

the i'l.ag

lowered . 36

lives o£

By this time 1

tne ma.in column had 1n.ade good its re tre at , encountering only the ad.va.nce
t:,ruard of the .Federal

J!'irst :Ui vision.

Thus, .Fort Henry be caroo the first major step
of the eventual defe at of the Confederacy .

In add :cion1

It does

criticism.

seem

direction

':i.he fort coulci not
It

held with even a larger garris on than it had.
ar.d oatgunued.

in the

111as

ita position has come in

Have

'been

badly outm.anned
f or ve ry

severe

to ha.ve been badly situated for e :fi e ctive de-

f'ense even between adversaries

of more

equal strength.

Speaking oi'

the surrender in his report, Lieutenant Colonel Ltl.lton A . Hc9i)TnfHs 1 Chief
of the tennessee Corps of V olunteer .Artiller.J had. this to s a;r ;
Hailey" was of

certainJ.y

re cess ity

to llenaral

conipe lled to S"lli'render,

urant • s investing arli\V•

tion, not its d.e.fenders . u J7

the

if

11.t> ort

no t to the gt.mboa:ts 1

The fault was in its loca

1'ilghman, who d.istru.sted the

pos ition f1•om

OOg:i.nning, describes it in his report I

The wre tched military position • • • •unfor tunate location . . . .
The entire fort toge ther with the e ntrenche d camp spoken of ,
is enfiladed from three or fo:1r points on the oppooite shore 1
while three points on the e astern bank cornple tely command them
bot'h, all at easy cannon range . At the s ame t ime the en
trenched camp a.rrar.ge d as it was in the bes t posn ible manrsr
to mee t the case , was two thirds of i t completely under the
control of th£."' fire of the gtmboats . The histocy of milita.t"''J

360:f'fic:tal. Re cords ,

31�. , 147 .

Series I, Vol . 7 ,

133.

29
engineer1rl[; re cords no parallel to this case ,.
Points rdth
in a .few miles of it, posses::.:: inG gre at advantages and few
disadva:t'ltat:�s , were t.ota.J.Jy negle cted., and a lo c ation fixed
upon vrl thou t one redeern.ing fe atare or filling one of the
man./ requiren�nts of a s ite for a work su ch as J:t�ort HenT"J•.38

lmrn.e diately following ti:�C capture of the

Lieu tenant Comrn.ander
Tennessee

as cend the

fort, Foote sent

S,. L. Phelps wi th the three wooden gu.nboate
and de stroy com.rm.Ulications and shi9 •?inr;

Muscle Shoals at Florence , Alabama..

as

to
far as

TLis expedition was speedily'

carried out with the gunboats capturine two steamers and for cing the
Confederates to burn six others ., 'b3s ide the half comple te d t,"Unboat,
Eastpor t,

which

was

found

stands of an::::s

two hundred

stores were destroyed.

at

the landing at Cerro Gordo .

In

addition,

were captured, and various other military

Als o 1 the railroad

Fort Henry was se cured, and part of

bridge

twent-.r miles above

the track was dastroyed.39

After the fall of F or t llcr.ry , it was evj_dent to the Confederate leaders that. a combimd land and water attack on Fort Donels on was
im.!J.inent.

The s-:.tcces s of the gunboats at Fort Henry made i"ti obviou.s

that the .Fe dera.J.£ would not waste time in making
Done ls on ,
ooen

a sirlilar attack on

Late i n Janum"Y, Brigadier Go r:aral. Gideon

placed

in ch.art-e of tlre

Donelson and Nashville .

Confederate

J. Pillow had

forces at Clarl:sville , between

After TUchman be ca"'O

a pris oner

at 1-�ort

Henry, Brigadier General fushrod Johnson was made col'.lt!'..ander at

Donelson.

Almost i:mnediately

(the follcminc day )

Fort

Pillow was ordered to

move all his troops from Clarl::si.ri lle to Donels on and as � ume co:m:mam.

38�. , 138-139 .
39�. , 15.3-154 .

.)0
Troops were

moved !'rom Hopkinsville

John B. Floyd
to

as sume

from

was

to Clarksville tmd Bric;adier Geoora.l

ordered .from his ca.·np

at

Russellville to Clarksville

command there in support of .Done lson .

Gil:.ac r , who had

Fort Henxy jus t bei\}re its surrender , a.idc d in the last-minute

defense of Donelson.

preparations for tl:te

Johnston als o

ner with his div-ision from Bowling Green ·to Donelson.
considerable

was
as

disa.greelil0nt among the
an

to whether or not

were

all-out

been to

This ide a

Donelson.

make

was

a.

ordered

Although there

ra:nldng Confederate officers

in

the garrison.

Johns ton's plan

calculated defense of liia.'S hv:ille at

als o held

by Pillow1 l1ith

F'lO'IJd and Buclmcr

feeling th at such a stand was not likely to accord succe s:s .

of seniority

the

corJl.llld
lltl

Buck•

stand should be taade a.t the fort, there

by Ii'ebruaxy lJ about 17 1000 men

seerns to have

in

escaped

o:f r ank, .Floyd be came the

COl:Jr;1a:rtder; Pillo11

v;as

&J

vir·tue

second

wlt.h .a,ckner in charge of tim rigpt w-.i.:ng and B. R. Jolms on

left. 40
..uter his success a.t Fort Hen.ry, Grant telegraphed Halle ck :

» I shall take and destroy F'o:rt Donelson on the 8th and. return to Fort

Henry. •4l

He was unable to .tulfill this

bad roads , and the
rain made

the roads

fact that

Heavy

gunboats

l'his mcess H.a.ted their going back down the

Life of Johns ton,

-

of tho

t he two forts

and he wanted to allow tinte f or the

come up in support .

40Johnston,

lw ·was waiting for reenforcements .

covering the eleven miles between

virtuall;y impassable ,

to

promise probably be cause

-

----
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'I'ennessee to Paducah., "UHmce U!J the Ohio to the :nouth of the Cumberland,

and up that river to Fort .Oonclson.

Grant • s :forces reconnoi tared the

area between the two f orts dur ing the intervening time 1vith Grant him
self riding to within a mile of the Confederate works on

the day after

the fall of F'ort Henry.
'lbere were two very good roads be �reen the two f orts .

One _, the

dire ct ro ad , connected the two forts at a distance of twelve miles .
T'ne

otJ:1er

ing

Fort IIezry

B'WUng off to the southeast for some dist<:mce s oon after leav
and tr..en paralle led the other for abou t tvdeve miles

terminating at the
which had falle n

town of Dover.,42

on

Cons idering the a bundance of raL"l

them, these roads were in good condition .

only portion of them which pro1.red di.fficu.lt

back

of Fort Henry, where they

was

traversed the

The

the first tvro miles

lowland wbi.ch was flooded and
...

J3e cause o f this 1 the l"e derD.l e.rtillery and

Inarshy in some places .

much of the infantry was moved back to the high t,Tound on F'ebru �
Beyond this difficult stretch, the roads p as sed thr ough

eleventh.

heavy tirabered_, rollin[; country which

roads

1rere

found to be clear

and

was sparsely populated.

The

unobstru.cted vthen the I•'ederal.s first

came upon them, and their cava.l.l:w activl ty prevented ar�y subsequent
work of obstruction by the Confederates , if any was ever

It has since be en

deemed

attcr:lj-Jted,.LJ

by some writers unfortunate for t.he Confeder

ates that the roads "Were not obstructed , as a delay would have

the arnt•r

on

caught

the march in ver<-J severo we ather .:md mi£Pt have contribu ted

42arant, Me:moirs 1 I1

43officiaJ.

�,

Re cor

294-295 .
Series I, Vol. 7 , 161-162 .•

expedition.t4

to breaking up the

On Februoo.7 twelfth, Grant moved on l?'ort Donels on with about

151000

men,

His organization remained the s ame , with

Smith, and Brigadie r General le"Ws WalJ.aoo
Part of Smith ' s re giment was left
Wallace • s com.""Jancl .

as

McClerna.nd, c . F •

his d:�vis ion

as

corJ.manclers .

a garrison at Fo:et Henry under

The troops trure deployed in line of battle t.L.at

s a:-ne dey 1rl.th Sr.Uth co:;;:rdi
r;J.an r.tg tho
fourteenth, fJallace

left., �1cClernand the right.

On the

carae up and occupied the cc r�ter allowing r.IcClernand.

to more fully j.nveat

the Confederate loft in

Wh.en the gunboats and

front of the tmm of Dover .

tra:nspar'ts arrived on the :night of the tb.irteenth,

the 10,000 reenforcements brought with them

vere

assigrJed ·to this ce nter

ae ctar under Wallace .
The thirteenth

was

spent by tl'1e Federals in

drawing tte ir lines

closer and

placing thair artillery in advantageous positio:ns all along

the line ,

iflU ch

dense growth of'

J..e:ry fire .

diff iculty was

brush

encountered in the latter ·because of the

and trees which prevented observation for art.il-

ArtJ.. l)tHY axcha.:nges and s ld.rmishes were coiruilOn all

The l''ederal t roops had.

b.:r

nov,r

that J.a3r.

e stablishe d their line on a r idge running

roog.hly' par.'ll.le l and ju;;:;t opposite three uncormected ridges on t•hich

the Goni'e derate rifle pits

were

struct breastworks except f ::r

44Johnston,

s ituated.,

'll1e I"ederalz d.id not

con-

co-."'er for artille ry in s ome place s .,

I.:i fe of Johnston_.

446. �he rr!a:i.. n fo rce of the
on the twelfth.
The temperature
dipped a.lr.'.os t to zero the following evening, and the entire area

l•'ederal arnw moved

The

1FOrii Tor� Henry

underwent a eevera storm of s now, sleet, and hail.
'lhis was sorely
felt by both an.U.es , but by this time the Federals were bivouacked in
the woods before Fort Donelson.
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distance between the two armies
dred

was

by this t:i,cne

only abo�lt .f.i.ve

hun

yarc.s .4.5
The most heated action o:f that d8iY was an attack

n1ade by

a

brigade of lJ:c:Clernar.d• s Division against a Confederate battery in the
left center of their line ,
investing

.forces

The bsttery which had been siving Mc:Clernand • s

trouble all day 1ii'a5 situated in an advantageous posi-

tion on the crest of

the ridge form1ng

tl'le Cor.t.fe<Wrate center,

M:c:Cler-

nand, seendngly ·wi t.hout

forethought or justifiable

tlJfl position attacl:red.

In order to attack, tho bl'igade j<ait to descend

reaso r.s 1 ordered

from the :ridg'O on whi ch they had tulren position, cross tl:le b:road ravine 1
ar.d advru ,.oo up the s ide of the ridt;e on which
for tl.f.ie dJ t.he las t port:i.o:n o:f "this attack
s able abatis of .felled tiniber and
deaccmdeu
an

even

was

higher

one

hun-Jl-e d .fee t

brush .

sher.:: r .folly ,

ove r

were

tho alJo.os t. impas-

'I'he ridce i'rom which

they

hil!,h , and the pos itL n at·i:.a.c;red occupied

point on the oppos ite

federate lire s was

·Mw

tr.�e Confederates

ridge .

This

at.tci,xpt on the Con-

"hen the attackers began tbe

ascent

t.lwough the abatis , they were me t wi th a 1nurderous cros sfire from
artillery, as we ll as srna.ll ann.s from t�J.e rifle pits •

lltho:J.gh they

a.ttempt.46

fou.gl:Jt bra.ve],y 1 they

vrere

.A sirnilar at tack

1rtade agains t the Cor..federate right by a por·tion af

Ti&s

beaten back a.nd .for ced to a.ba.1·1don the

.Smith • s Division tr.lth sim.ila:r result4> .

Otl:.e:rwise , slr:..in'lishe s were

fought .fail:•J.y eer..erally alol'J.g the o ntire line through:.;ut the day.

16ofi'icial.
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That

afternoon

and

nic:ht ·ta�e

v:eather took a

sudden turn from.

mild1 clear course which it had followed for several dey"s .

the

1� s low rain

began to fall in the aft�rnoon, and by ni;;:;ht this had develope d into

The temperature went down to ten degrees , and hard

a heaV'J downpour .

winds

turre d the

rain into

a bliz zard of s le e t and snow.

Doth armie s

suffered terribly as both vrere forced to weather the s torm 1rl.thout

In

shelter or adequate clothing •
who la;r in the

no

addi tion1

ma.ey- of the day ' s wounded_.

man 's land between the lines , too far

helped, e ndured the terrible night.

out to be

Despite the miserable conditions,

artill: ry fire w as c ontinue d throughout the nir:;,ht by both

sides J and

dur ing lulls in the s torm, flames raged through the brush :maki.ne the
night

a

veritable hell for the troops of both

a.rmies.47

The following morning tho entire F'ederal notilla arrived, and
although land action was at a minimum all

peace and quie t in the fort .

day1 there was far from

Foote ,. 1t'flth four ironclads and trto

wooden gunboats , attacl<:.:ed at three o ' clock in the afternoon.

Fort Henr;r, he soug,ht to steam

of

a.

off 81."'fY"

the

posc.Jible

1'.he gunboats opened fire from a distance

mile and a ha.l.f and advanced until they

the batterie s .

at

straight up to the fort and s ile nce

batteries a..">d then to pass above the fort and cat
retreat by the Confederates •

As

were within

150 yards of

However , the Confederate t::;tms were effectivezy manne d ,

and, vthile the ten

light pieces did little da."Rage to t.."IJ.e

armored

gun

boats , the gum1ers poured destructive fire at them with the Columbiad

and loni;: ran::.:ed :rifle d gun.

Itr tho <md o.f

bacl: downstream.

'l'horc

fif.ty-f<YJ.r C<l.S\.H1ltics uboa:.�d tho ;_::u nboak 1

while not one

·�::as los t in tito ConfoJ.c:rate

'l"hat

:lUll

s aJ�l.O

VJ'Cl"C

morni•lf:. I"lcr.rd called a

an

bour ru1d

a

tat i:eries .48

ccr.J.ncil of

trar

:!.n w:: ich all the

Confederate co:umanders agreed to evacuate the p oo:2.tion.
was caused

30,000

to

partially by ·�';'}IJ

ha..lf' , all tl1o

'Zhis dc c:�s:i.o::

c.xa;):;eratod reports that Gr.:rr:;t was

)01000 raen.forccrilD:n ts

roce:!.ving

ru.1d partialJ�;r

the victory of the vmter b::.tt;,:; rios

:wer

tLc r�;.nbow.ts , Flo;,td still

realig.1u:tent of tb;dr trocps .49

of tho G on.fe der;:;.to dofeDse;;:;

on

tho c :::treme left and cx·os;:;ccl t:.;c inter-

dire -:: tion to Clw.:dot t.e and. tl:o :nee on tc l�a.shvillo •
Divis ion was ·

n1o Foder:::J. li'irs t

s trooc;J¥ :pos ted acros:'> and alone th.is ;road.

Its use ·nould

entire road of Federal tr oops •
'fh.e :plan of battle c alle d for an at,tack by Pillow ' s left TJine .

49Ibid.

Buckner wculd remove

his e ntire force .f:rom t!!e tre:ncJ:�s on the right ,.

leaving onJ.y one re gir:J.e nt of four hundred and fj.ft�r �n to
sector and form to tho rear of and in support of Pillow .

that

defend

Everything

want according to sche ,;.ule , and tho attack was made at five A . M.

When

Pillow ' s advancing columns came upon McClerna.nd• s line ., they found them

of

in line
as

battle .

For ttree hours the Coni'ederates were successful

they drove their adversaries back foot by foot.

At eight A. M.

It could not be

McOlerna:nd appe aled to Wallace on his left for

aid.

r:iven

from Grant, who

as

Wallace ' s hands wore tie d by an order

con.t'erence vrlth Foote abroad his gunboat several miles away •

now on

the

on of a

Continued pressure by Pillow with Buckner a.:Lding

rieht flank pushed :McC1e rnar.d 1 s nen back two miles ani

line .

litera.ll;),. into Wallace 1 s
flict in

in

The order

departure and prohibited tho br:l.ngi r:g

was given before Grant ' s

cene:rtU.. engagon�mt.o

was

self-defense .

Thus , \ihi.llace

�� earJ..v

v;as

afternoon, t11e

broucht :Lnto

e ntire route

the con

of

e scape

was cleared•-

At this point, one of the r,rea.te s t tactical blunciers of a war
filled
the

with such

fort

in

blunders

ocC'..trred,

retre at and thus

Iiather than march the arrey- out of

preserve invaluable

numbers

and expe rience

for the Confederate cause 1 Pillow reversed t.he plan of battle and

ordered the troops

back into the fort.

Buelmer questioned

ity to do this , and I<'loyd1 who arrived on

his author

the scene, agreed with

fuckm r .

A s hort time later, after he h ad consulted Pillow, fi'loyd reversed

decision

<;J.nd re ca.ll0d the

troops to the

fort. 50 It

his

is difficult to sq
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why this indecision was prevalent among the Confederate leaders .
tributing

causes might have

teen ine:A.-perience 1 inability to evaluate

the situation accurately 1 and

posdbly fe ar

of failure.

Meanwhile , Grant, re turning to his for ce s as fast as

after learning of
been four or

the Confederate attack, came

five miles

north of the

of

possible

upon the s cene .

lines when

and with the marshy roads retarding him, he was
the field

Con

He

had

conferring with Foote 1
s ome time

getting

on

In arrivi ng at the point of the Confederate

action.

attack, he passe d tl'£l

left and center of his line , finding all to be

in good order there .

Sizing up the s ituation accurately, he guessed

just what had happe re d within the Confederate line s ; the right had been

immedi-

left undermar.ned in order to 11ake the attack from the left.

He

ateJ,y ordered his

'!his was

own

left to attack

probably the first evidence of
Smith ' s Divis ion

the Confederate

Grant ' a

right.

milita.ry genius .

Ckn:eral c . F .

attacked vigorouslY and b,y night had taken the de

tached and disoom:ected rifle pits on the Confederate •a extreme rig:ht

and forced fuekner•s troop s ,
tru:·ough1

to take a

who

had returmd fran the attempted break-

position on the

one

remaining rid{,re which separated

the Union forces from the water batterie s .

The position defended by

&lckner was now commanded by the elevation of his previous rifle pits
in Federal hands . 5l
line

were

Consequently, the Federal troops along the entire

reformed and ordered to advance 1 thus retak"'ing th.e ground

which had been lost.

5J.arant1

Memoirs, I1

305-3o8.

That nig(1:i:. at Floyd ' s he adquarters in t.':�e Dover Inn, a.

mee t�.nc

of "tlie Con.federa.to COJ:l'linanding oi'f�.cel"'S wat: he ld .

councils 1 dis a.gree:.:L nt

wa:;;

f :L.ial

As in previous

the r.Jle and not the exception.

fucl:nar saw

no alternative but surr·e:nder , and :Floyd seomed to agree with him.

Pillow

tJ1ought that the fort should be held for one or if pos$i ble two 1n.ore days .

Colonel Na.tl::an B. l'orres t , wLose cava.J..r-i had plcyed

a

brilliant

role

in the previous dB¥ 's action, expected only to fight the following dq.

In lieu o:f sur1'e1lder1 he proposed that the entire garrison be m.ar che d
out over the \'\Ynn ' s Ferry Road1 as r£ had reports
troops had not re-occupied

promise

their

that his cavalry would

however·, t.1.e de cision was :nade

form.er positions .

that

tJ1e Federal

He ventured to

protect the re tre ating arn:w .

to surrender the .fort.

Finally,

l"o:rrast aslred

for and re ce ive d pe:t"lnisc ion t.o ntarch his cavalry out over the
road1

which

wac

under three feet of water .

a..;.d. tab."e his brigade wl th him. 52

ally

never

sarrender .

PilloT;

Irlcryd sour;hc als o to e s cape

insisted

Bu ckner fina4 B{,-TeeJ.

the fort and s-u.rronder it ..

river

that he would person-

that he 1rou.ld. remain in

Consequent],y 1 Floyd passed

Pillmv, and he , in turn, pas sed it to Bu ckner .

t.J.1e

c or;uand to

'l'hus , Fort Donols on

.52Floyd had been secretru:y of War prior to the beginning of
hostilities .
As such he was accused of dispers ing Federal troops prior
to the war in such a. manner that they v;ould be least effe ctive against

rebellion . He was also accused of moving arms and munitions from
arsenals to those in the South where tl::oey could be ea.si:cy
taken by' the Soutil should there be a rebellion. His capture probably
would haw resulted in his 1:irial for fraud, e nibe zzloroo nt1 and pos sibly
treason.
James lUliott Walmsley, "John Buch anan E'loyd1 " Diction!:Z �
American
ed. by Allan Johnston and Dumas Malone , 21 vols .
ana index (l
or : Scribner ' a ' 1928-1944 ) I VI, 487.
a.

northern

Bio�ap,
..
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i•'la..rzy- of the Confederates na.nac,�d to esca.:rle from l?ort Donelson.
Floyd left early Sundq mornina viith his b1·i�ade of Virginia troops

night.

aboard t.-wo boats l'l'hich arrived durLJg the

Others, including

Gilmer 1 were ferried across the river i'I'om whence they escaped.

Forrest marched his entire ca.va.lry comnand out ·through

the backwaters

carrying all th06e possible with him.

Artillery troops cu. t loooe their

horses and rode them 011t the sante wa;r.

others mere ly set out on foot

and in the confusion passed through the Pederal lines .

GeneraJ. B. n . Johnson

e scaped in this r:Jannar .

officer 1 he simply walmd ou.t of the fort.
abou t one hal£1 or

7000 to 8000

Brigadier

Acc oi11)aniad by anotr£Gr

In all, probabl;r only

men lTerc taken prisoner by the

Fort Donelson was a great victor:r

for the

Union.

lt was cele-

bra.ted as such.., and Grant and his three division c orm;'l.anders were
promoted to the rank of Maj or
was

Ge:ooral.55

Throughout

a terri.fic feeling of depression and do:fe at .

the South th.ere

The line o i' defense

was b:·olmn, and the South la\v open to the Federal invaders .
step in this

invasion will be dealt with in Chapter

III.

The elevation of 1 ort llency placed it at the mercy
Federal. f:."Wlboats .

The next

of

the

'l'he high water around the fort prevented an effec•

.$.3norn, AruJY; 2£

'renre ssee,

Skibid. 1 96-91,
a.vartable ..

These figures seem to be tt.te mos t accurate

estim..'1te

55 ara.nt.�� Memoirs,

I1

,316.

94-96.

tive de£e rJSe

on

only

'l'he fort fell af"OO:r:·

the landt'tard s ide .

a

ehort

struggle ; this mi;�;ht Lav0 r;eon prolon.....-.od 1vitl:� a larger and :-:tOl"e able

oo.fe:;,:.cl:�r:.c force .
u

•vell

as

Itv

inposs iblo position

site

of

was

to.?or;raphicoJ. advantageo shows that tl:c selection of the

Fort Henry was a grave

used to such

an

sa.'Ue nu.m'oor of g:ms
defeat

T:Ug..'lman

J;J.·ter made a.t Fort Doneleon whe:r·c there

mi;,:;talw .

'l��e elevation of tb.a b1;1i'i'
vm.s

well l:nor;-n to

others who col!ll:JC ntad t1.pon it in the reports mentioned.

TJ.-;.e s tiff defense which
-were a few

wac

decisively

..Uonc the river at Fort .Donelson

advanta{:e that th.e Confederates , with abou.t the
as

the

they had oaplo:,red at Fort Henry, Yrero .nblc to
::; anie

fleet of g..mboats which demolished that

fort and forced it to surre nder

in o�-

a.

short ont;a€,-eraont..

steep ridges around F'ort Donelson and the town of Dover
vir tually impl'egnable by the c onstruction of

surmnits and abatis to their i"..C'onts .

Wel"'

The high1
tnade

rifle pits .along their

All tl:le Federal charges

·were

�m ccessfu.lly repulsed by the Confederates in the se positions wi th tba

exce.ption of the i'inal cha.rt,re ar;a.:i.ns t cl:e incomple te d
defenders •

works

right; tho loss of this portion of the ir 1ine

the steep ridges and :;w-shy ravines within ��Jhe

was

on

t.l1e

due to

Conieclera.te lines \7hieh

prevented re-enforeetaents from arriving in time to r eliovo tbe out
r.u.rlbcred troops :L"l that sector .

CHltPTEP. III
THE BAT'I'L.l!: OF SHILOH
The fall of Forts Lcnr;r and Dorel s on resulted in the los s of the
entire line of defense for the Co1'.federates .

Ter:mssee Rivers

c ontrolle d b;r the F'ederal f�.lnboatc � tLo Confe clera.te

positions at Columbus and Bowlin.[; Green
the

l'fitt the Cl.l:raberlMd and

were

o:.Ltf1s.nlrod.

Rea.liz.ing

seriott s ness of his s ituation, Jol'.:ns ton had ordered BO'IvliP_.e Green
The a:r:cy there retreated to

evacuated even befoi-e Donelson fell.

Nashvi.lle to await the out.come of the s tr,tCD:1e for possession of the
Cumberland .

Wit.h

untenable .

the Federal victory at D0nelson, Nashville t:e crune

It see:ms

that Jo:b.ns ton •s

001'.'

plan

was

.his forcez n outh of the Te r:m ssee Hiver and there dispute
ad:va..1ce
1 .

all

to concentrate

the Federal

1

:Ja'1:t of the Con.federo.to s tares at Nashville rrere cva.cua;tcd,
b'..:tt the at"Cer confu:..ilon and chaos in the

cit;;,r \Yhich re:.rn.ltcd fr om the

approach of the Federals ca:v.ned much to be lc ft

populace

Under

;Jlundored b:r the

A lack of tran.o;:)ortation .fucl.li tie s caused much to r.Je

.

abandone d.
F'or:t'€H:Jt,

or

i'irs·t ilo;y·d1 after his o.rr-lval from DoP..elz on, and then

was in charge of eva.cuatin;;

the s tores and maintail1iP.g

the cirC'-L.T.s 'tance s � the se men did

work in this

capacity

lrforn, � 2£
2Johnston1

was

admirable

job.

.Floyd•s

hif;,hly praised by Has il w. Du:ks_, biographer

frennessee 1

� .2f

an

order. 2

99-107

Johr.s ton,

•

t:.9B.

of Colonel John n.

After the

rJorgan.J

loss o:f Nashville and the control of the 'l'enressae and

Cu.m.berland. Rivers , the

mos t irrrp orta11 t

strategic

was the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

pos ition in the wer;t

This road

connected

Missis s ippi River 1.vith tle Atlantic Coast at Charleston.
southe as t from

lVlem.phis throagh

Alabama a.long the southern

the

It swung

northern Miss issippi and across northern

bank

of tba Tennessee H.iver.

Conne ctions

could be made from its main tracks to Chattanooga and the railroad
route northward throagh Knoxville to Virginia.

ton

met the ·renne ssee River

the Mus cle Shoals .

lhis

was

The Memphis and

Charles

from the west at Sheffield, Ala.bama1 near
the extent of low-water navigation on the

Tennessee and, thu s , the exte:nt of the con'b:'ol of tl1e Federal gunboats

eu t

over tl·�e river.

Johnston, realizing that Grant would seek to

the railroad at the earlies t

posc:ible

tiJlJe , s our;ht to concentrate

every available man in an effort to s tem the tide of the Federal.

advance •

'£he best place for this concentration was at Corinth, Mis

sissippi, where the .Memphis

<hio Railroad.

Charleston Cl"ossed the

Mobile and

Corinth was situated only about twenty-two miles !rom

the 'l'enreasee ftiver and
observe the

and

offered

an

excellent po;::dtion from

�'ederal movements on the river .

accunn.1lated large

s tores

which to

Here , the Confederates

o£ supplies even before the

arrival

of the

various portions of t.� a.rnw .4

3&sil w. Dtdre , Histo:z of MoHan ' s Cav� ( Cincinnati :
7-518.
Printine and Publishing t!o . , 187)1),

4uorn, Arr][ � 're nrJ.:�ssec,

107-108 .

Miami
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Uajor Ge neral P, G,. T. &aure gard., 'Who assul1l9d c orm:l13.nd in

the

Columbus sector on E'ebruary 15, e le cted to evacuate that fortress :ln

order to shorten the Confederate lines of communication .
that it

was

v:i.rtuully cr..ttflanked by the Federals on the Tennessee

Riwr further i:nfluenced this de cision.

Ten and New L'ladrid, :'.1is::; ouri 1

Nu.miber

defense

'l'he fact

as

line which ran from these points

to its e ru.; tern terminus at Corinth.

mitted easy concentration

Thic

withdrawal left

the ;:1os t advanced Confederate

s outheas t acros s Tern�szee

Mlile this line was long.,

at any one point bo cauae of the

the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

Isla.i:d

7000

He lo ft abo:.J.t

mn

it ad-

proximity

o£

at Island Nw:lber

Ten and New 1l�id and 9laced the remainder of the Columbus earrison,

l<¥X'O

ron, at Humboldt, 'l'enm ssee , close to the center of this

line . 5

1le&1Whil.e , the ll'e deral.s began a moverrent up the Tenrassee .

'lhe

ultinw:te obje ctive was to sever Confederate c ommunications at such
places as Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt; the

immediate objective

to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Cree k
sippi, on

the Memphis

and Charleston line .

ne ar

Eastport,

on the east banlc

in Hardin County.

at

1/dssis-

In preparation f en:' this

General. c . :F. Smith oocan the expedition on March te nth ..

thirteenth he landed his four divls ions

was

On t.'lw

Savannah , Tennessee , a town

hi:JOd:LateJ.y Smith sent Major General

William T. Sherman with his division in nineteen steamboats escorted
by the gunboat,

!ller1

to dastrat.r

the bridt,re .

44
This atwm:'t resulted in utter failure ..
troops leJ.1d.ed tLan

a.

No sooner had the :F'ederal

violent s tor.:n began, and tJJ.�:� water rose in the

stroa:15 a:t tl .e rate of six incLos pe r 1vJt:tr.

'l'he divi:.;ion

to retire to j.ts ·t.ra!1Si)Ol�ts and fall back dmvnstre am,

so h�.el1 1 th.e boats could fin:d

roacl1ed

no

forced

was

V,j th the river

they

suitable �"lace to la:nd until

Pittsburc Le.nc;.inc, where high blnffs rise

pr·ovide dr,:;r gro;md sui table for e nc.:uitiliJl(mt .

on

th.e vrost bank and

1'hc lnndine:; is about s:ix

miJes ups tream from Sava.rmah and almos t. twenty-two miles from ·t11e

Confederate s t.ronghold at Corinth t
it served

the river

as

J.At"1 dine;

In ea.rl:L::; r and more peaceful tiJaes _,

for Corinth and was

connected with that

place b.;.r two r;:ood roads • 6
Gra.ut had been in the bad graces of Halle ck a nd1 consequent:cy-,
was

t..e:ii:_.iorari�· removed from command

teenth he

was

on

March sixth.

restored to command a.nd moved prOitr.Ptzy

On

the

thir

to SavaDr�ah

arrived at Sava"lnah , he found a.bcru.t half tho ru·n�r e nea';'lpod there
t!1e

ee.st bank,. one division

raid on tb:e :.rcmphis and Charleston Hailroa.d.
as

Don C arlos Buell's

Nashville ,

on

und.er Ger.eral UYW Wr�:tlace at Cn11:1p ts Landing

at Pittsburg LandL1g , where he had retired after

against Cor'int..l-t,.

<M.�.ere

the failure

of his

Grt.mt prepared to march

soon as he c ould be re-e:nforood b;7 ;,rajor Genera.J.

Army of tbe Ohio1 VJhich

was

marching ov�'Jrland from

In pre:;aration for this advance , Grant ordered the

6orf'icial H.ecor�,

Series I_, Vol, 101
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d ivisions

ot: BrigadJ.or General w. .!I. L. Wallace a.nd

i'i:ajor General Stepl::o n A,.

tslrlbu.t to move from Savanr1ah t-:> .Fitwh�.1rg Landing and there oncc:mp.
General 1!cCle:rnand 1 s ilivin ion
tLe river .

was

sm:t

directzy thoro w:·,en it came up

T'nus 1 Grant :nad four divis ions in the a..� a arcr..md

fiVes-

iug daily1 they were orgw.lze d into bricades and later into wl1at bo ca.�
the Sixt•lt
•

Division com,;aanded b�.r l�:i:ajor Gomral

B. M, Prentiss . 7

When the fall of F ort Done ls on and the advance of EUell 1 s a.rli\Y
I'Emiiered l�ashviJ.le indefensible ,

In order ·to

i'orra

a

Jolmston fell

ba.c�� on 1ill.fr
.tr eesbor o .

junction with Beauret;ard a t CorilJ.th1 he evacuated

disci:t;lincd and fresh nwn to uove
Johns ton and Beauregard at

from Pellsacola, Florida, to j oin

Col"inth.9

Thus , with appro::d.mately 40,000

rnen

concentrated at Corint.'-1 the Confederates 1 .r:or tJile first t:�r.:e in

the

west,

ryound

the Federals .

7orant,

themselves vti th

It

was

� 2£.

9 lbid. , 513 .
-

arnw

Johnston ' s plan to

M�::aoirs, I.,

8 Johnston,

an

324-3.)3.
Johnston,

505.

lru:ge enough to do battle 1vith
do this 1

bei'ore £hell cou.ld
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Hardin Cou.nty 1 l'cr..ne s sec 1 in which the later battle of Shiloh
occurre d, c ontains ;)a:r·t.s of two of tl..e
s tate .

In t.b.e eastern se ction of the

ph;,vsiographic regions oi' th.e
county is tl::e s ou.i;bern part of

tl:.e Highland Rim, with its rugg;ed terrain of rocks wad

streams .

swii't-i'lowing

In the west is the s outb.e a.s t col'l'lel:' of the Slope of ·�Jes t

county anC:. followi.ng a two hundr·ed and f::.f·tzy- to three hun.dl•ed foot deep

The flood ,plain of th.e r::i..ver vades

from one to four

mile s in

In places along the ou ts ide of t.h.e s tre am curve s , bottoms
Buth Savarmab. .:md. Pittsburg Lal1dinE

absent .

tiona, the fol'iacr

on

no

Tenr..e s see from tl:Je v�est are

bo/17..toill6 1 llhlch

are

located in such posi-

rising directJ.3.� :i.'rom the l'iver and

hitm-water pl·obloms .

i£1l..la diate

cntirel3'

the c as t bal."'Jc and the lat"wr on t.i:..at o:f tl1k! west.

'l'lrils 1 :.,ot.1. place s appear as bluJ.'f:;

lta.ve

are

are

widtllt

The s treams flowing int..o the

slug, ish and t,"Emerall;v have con.s icierable

,1sually dawp and sogCf and s �.xaet:W.;.es r,l&'sl"l;}'" •lO

Be-

fore <:.he Temlessee Valley �httbori"o/ harnessed the r iver for flood conu�ol

me&1Ul'eS ,

these streams were subject to O"ver.flaws caused by high

water in the 'i'e noo ssee ..

1862.11

'l'hia was tbe case in

The topography on the wes tern

much oi' it being

of'

a

rolling nature .

s :lde of the river i5 vm:ied1
!!�&IV kinds of timber abound 1n

l<ltt. B. Jewell, "Geology and Mineral
Coun't\V1 Te m� ssee , " in Tennessee Geological
(Na.shvillo : Ambrose , l?jl), 12-14.
llibid..
- ' 102 ..

the earl,y sp1•ing or

Resources of Hardin
Survez lblletin, No.

37
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The only town in the

thick groves ar..d s crub f orm.

c ounty

of

a.n;;r s ize

at the time in question was Savannah, which became first Smith ' s and
Its

later Gra.nt •s headquarters .

population

in

1870

was

around five

hundred.l2

Remnants of plateaus
Usually erosion h.as

county.
of the

or

soft

of the

na t'1.1re

pa.rtiaJ.J,y dis se cted

evident in the we s tern p art

are

been

rocks .

r apid

on

o£ the

the plateau s lope s becau s e

Of'tentinies , tl.wse remnants

and cut a:t�ey by s treama .l3

are

wholl;r

Tb.e battlefield of

Shiloh was one of the be 't.ter preserve d of these plateau remnants .
At Pittsburg Land:Lng , where Grant ' s army

bluff rises from the river to
with a

good road to the f o ot

a.

height

was

of' the bluff 1 an excellent s te amboat

r-lver ran close to the

bluf£1 that be ing the outside of the s tream curve .

P'rom tt1e

or

four log cabins and a

wrinkled plateau ,
table-land. •l4

described by

Its level was

Buell in
the

ravines , wh :l ch opened into the river .

ra:vines a:n.d

l2J.

(l�ash".tille :

fa.ir:cy-

miles in

a s ort

of

hie report as an nundulating

from eighty to

the level oi' the river and toward

Here , a mere ham-

post office were situated.

the land stre tched back for f i ve

landing

'l'hus 1

of about a hundr d feet.

la.:nding was pr ovided, as the ch anne l of the

let of three

e ncamped, a s teep

one

hundred fee t above

e ast was creased and cut by cktep

�llile it was

heavily wooded, there was

cut with

ample open ground

for the

B. Kille brew, Introduction to the Resources o:f Teru:essee
Tavel, Eastman, ana f:t6we!l;-lti'14) I !M&:!o�i3.

l)Jewell1 loc .

cit . ,

-

15-16.
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camps and

In

drill of an arnzy- of

addition, the

and s outh.

a hundred thousand men,. l5

area was flanh."'d by strea.nw both to the north

ln the .forroo r direction, Owl Cree ls: rises about

and

west of the r iver

flowing east

flows northe as t , until it J'.l'Jee ta Snake

where it :finds its mouth

to the TenTJessee ,

On the s outh, Lick

belm1 t.he landing,

four

Creek

miles

Creek

about a mile

r:i..s�;s re ar the sou.rce

of Owl Cree k but flows generally e as tward to its mouth two miles above

the

landing .

.from

Ravines , cut

the sides of tho

by eros::'Lon, oven into these various creeks
This is especially true on the north

plate au .

area was a.

along Owl Creek,

Generally, the

there was a

farm of twenty to

There
these

small
were

followed

a.

two

more

eight acre s , l6

good roads from the
or

forest, but occas iona.lly

landing to

less direct route by way

miles from. Pittsburg and ten miles from Corinth ,

the

ltidge fi.oad or the Bark Eoa.d1 follo"''�ed

and

j oined the

:no.re d::. re ct or

these,

One of

of Monterey , thirteen

The other, known as

course

more to the north

.Monterey Road s oL'le five

In ad.dition to

from the landing .

a.

Corinth .

there were

mile s out

two roads .from

Pittsbu:q; Landing to Crump 's Landing , one of v.i.lich followed close to
the

river.

This road c ontinued

a landinc four or five miles
Lar.ding road was
teen miles to the

a

road to

aps tre a.m.

16roid.
, 293.
-

:G'ranching off from the

Crump 's

Purdy1 county seat of McNairy Cou..."l..ty 1 six-

northwest of

l5rbid. , 21 .

southward beyond Pittsburg to Harribur g1

Pittsburg .

·rhere

were two roads which

49
ran northward from Honterey

the Ridge Itoa.d.
This became
r:dJ.e s out.

·p 0,,:, ,

""'"'

� ·

an

At

one

to P...trcy

and S av<J.nn.s.h , both oi

of the se cros::roo.d.s lived

a

vrhich crossed

fatili}y na.':led Miclmy.

it:lpori.aJ:J:. landmurk i.'or t.he C<m;;:'e deratc troops .

Somo five

from Pittsburg Landing tbe var·ious roads rJZ·anched out in

a

17

.f.: oix.t ·t,.:.s ?m:·cy Road cr-:>sse d

Cor L: t.h �-..o ad a.r,i,d. followe d

unC.e:c Colonel Jo1'lll A .

a

ho�vily'

50
the

Hamb.trg Road.

In front of these posi tiona 1 the r idge fell awq to

a series of deep ravines ..
and undergrowth and

11ere

These ravines were thickly set viith trees
f lo oded or

boggy along

most of the line . l8

To Sherman' s left, with a cons iderable interval be tween and
fill:i.ng the gap !»tween Sherman 1 s First1 Third1 and Fourth Brigades on

the Corinth and

Purey Roads and his

Se cond Brigade on the Hamburg Road1

was Prentiss r Sixth Division, with uneven r olling ground to its front.

SherrJlan • s and

Prentiss ' Divisions were tl:e

outposts for the

Federal

They occupied the space between Owl and Lick Creeks a.t a

camps .

ne ar their source , where they were less than

To

the rear of

Sherman and

three miles

apart.l9

Prentiss and covering the interval

between them, 11ere the camps of McClernand's First Division.

miles

to the rear

Smith ' s ,

� two

of the advanced divisions were Hurlbut ' s Fourth and

later w. H. L.

right respectively.
Crump ' s

point

Wa.lla.ce ' s ,20 Se cond Divis ions on the left and

lew llfall ace ' s Third Division remaioo d encamped at

Landing guarding the s torage

Although the Federal a:r:rrv

point far the Federal

supplie s , 2l

<.lid not intrench or otherwise constl"''lct

defe ns ive positiona 1 the area. itself provided good ground for defense .

2

l8ll1lliam

1B7S}, I; �!o.

l9lbid.
20Pr1or to and during the
ca.paci tated by an accidental 1e g
Mansion, Grant ' s headquarters at
tion not long after the battle .
comrnanded in his absenee •

2lsherm.an1

She,

T. Sherman� ?.femoirs of General William T .
AppletonJ
&rea:I'ter atea as � mo:Lrs .

vola. (New York#

Memoirs 1 I,

General

battle
c . F. Smith was in
injury. He remained in the Cherry
Savannah , where he died from infec
Brigadier General w. H. L. Walla.ce

236.
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The Federal leaders were later

they

severely

considered themselves employed

expected the Confederates to leave
attack them in their camps . 22

repor t on March

small comrnand and
area

attributed

well-built

Speaking of

The ground

ne gle ct ,

but

defenses at Corinth and

the

F'ederal position in a

11 I am

ea;r :

of the position, both for

its strategic position.,

this

offensive cam))aign and l::�&"dl,y

8.."1

17 , Sherman had this to

with the importance

of' the

in

criticized for

its

strongly impre s se d

land advantages and

itself admits of

e asy defense by a

yet affords admirable camping gro...md. tt2.3

'l'he selection

around Pittsburg Landing far the Federal ca.rr\P is genera.J.:cy

to Smith, vtho

ordered the flrst men

there •

Of the area

Johnston s&¥s :
It .was, in fQ.Ct, a formidable natural £ortification. With
few and difficult approaches , g..tar ded on e ither flank 1:w im
passable stre ams and morasses 1 prote cted lJ1J a succession of
ravines a.rd acclivities , each com.'JJld
l.nde by eminences to the
re ar , this quadrilateral seemed a sa.fe fastness against attack
hard to a.ssail1 easy to defend.
Its selection Wf!S the dying
gift of the soldierly c . F. Smith to his eause . 24

During

tl:Je latter part of March, the Confederates kept a strong

detachment a.t Bethel Spri.11 gs on t.he Mobile and Ohio Railroad and at
Purdy1 four miles east.

at Crump 1s and

From this posi tion,

Pittsburg.

they watched the

:f'ederals

\\hen it be came evident that I:hell 'W&S

near

ing Savannah vrlth his a.:riey" 1

Johnston e lec te d t o follow his previous plan

and attack Grant before the

tr:o

a.nnies could be

joined.

22 Grant, :Vemoirs, I, 3.33.

2.3official
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24Johnston, � .2£ Johnston, 5.31.

10_. 27.

Thus, on April

52
3

he issued orders to that effect.

The overall plan of battle was to

malr..e ever-rJ effort to turn the F'ederal ' s

left fiank, thus c-J.tting off

their lire of retreat to the Tennessee River and driv!.ng t!:em back

on

OWl Cree k where they would be forced to surrender.25

The Confederate forces 1 knmm as tl:Je A:rr:q of lliseissippi, was

organized into four corps .

General

Bragr;, the Second

General Hardee ,

Tho Firs t

b;;r Major

and the Reserve by

The Third

Corps

was

to

Ridge Road to the Bark Road.
nif";ht a.t

Mic�y 'e

Savannah a."'.d

move

Corps

was

rxe:oor al Polk,

Brigadier

cotn.;landed by Hajor

the

Third by Maj or

General Irecld:nridge .

that same dSJT .t April third,

on

tlw

If posc_ible , it was to bivouac that

at the interse ction of the road from

Purcy.

At 3 :00 A . �1. on the fourth, it

Monterey to

was

to l'llO"JO forward

by the Bark Road until within sieht of the Federal outposts and there
be deployed in lire of battle acroe s the entire front

extending from

Lick Cree k to Owl Creek.
The Second Corps was to assemble on Monterey and move there at
once .

They 1rere th.en to move by the Sava..'ll'lah Road to �lickay * s 1 the

head of the column reaching tl�r-:: before night.
morning, they

were to

On the following

advance by the Bark Road as s oon as the rear of

the '!bird Corps should pasc: a."ld ibm in line of battle about 1000
yards to

the

rear

The First
had

been ta.ken1

of

that Corps .

Corps,

was

;

from which

the

de tachments at Bethel and

Purctf

to follow the line of :11al'ch of the Third Corps

a.

53
half hcr.1r to the

sar::Je interval.
form a

rear

a.nd bivouac tb.t.t ni;·jlt in t.hnt position at the

following dD\7, it

The

tli ird lL"};) with
Purdy

at Bethel a.."1d
Corps at the

to cont:i.nu.e

was

s imilar interval.

a

'rhe ?Ort.ior:.

to assenble and .'·J.arch to

was

on

the Bark Road and

of tl .at

cmnnand

j oin the rest of'

�"le

junction of tbe Purcy Head -rr:i. th the Bark Road.

The reserve

was

to

assemble at rt::ontere;{ by the sh ortest and

be s t routes and, thus forra to r:1arch toward tr.e
dire ct road or the

TUdge Road to P.lttsbu.rg,.

out in all directions btJ

front b.Y e ither the

Cavalry

was

the various commanders , so that

of the Con.f'edarates could be

disguised

as

well

as

to oo

the

throm

intention

poss ible . 26

It is of particular interest to notice that contrary to the usual
method of attack, whereby detachments

are

arransted in colUl'llllS perpendic

ular to tr.e line of defense 1 the Arr:rsr of t.he Mississippi was arra;red
in three parallel line s Yli th i ts

reserve

to too rear ..

caused cons iderable con:f'usion during the battle , &B

the

lines to the

:re ar were

attack line , thus ca.usir.c
co-:nm.ands .

detacruoonts from

t.'t."''wn forward into vro"iou.s :Jlaces in the
a

definite lack

The reason for such

the leaders thcr.J&ht these

This alignment

a."1

of

coherence

in carrying

out

ali(J'n;nont v1as probably the fact that

raw, ine::r:perienood troops would .f'ieht better

in :ra-niliar u.nits .
The plan was to attack

-tbe Federals ea:rly

in the morning of

Aprll

5.

This

was

not to be1 however, as the elements

havoc

v.dth the

war

in the west again assumed a prominent role .

which had

pla\}l'ed

Showers

fell all

day Thursdl\v1 the fourth, makin;::;

di..fficult for artillery and wagons .

moveme nt alone the d irt r oads

'I'hon, after midnight,

a.

spring

s torm brolre , making the night miserable for the Confedor.:!.te troopa 1 'Who

Th.e

-wrere lT'.arching without tents.

night

and ravi:res be cam impa.aoa.ble torrents .

its artillery and wagons
other colu.mns

Bragg ' s

1uere

Thus , it
About

near a

Howeve r , at

s tuck in the mud.

Corps had found the roads

'\'las

so

3 :00 A. M. on the

In addi tion, parts o£

aJ)pointed positions .

bad that it was several hours be·

o:f this daley- Polk ' s column had

Bra.gg 1 s entire com,;J.and

fiith.

pitch....a.ark and mere gullies

-were deJ.a¥'ed in arriving at their

hind schedule , and because
up.

was

11as

not i:n position until

4 :00

been held

:P. 11. on the

t.oo la'OO to attack that &Jv.2 7

that same time , the now

crossroads to the

rea:r:·

o:f war"

was

held

of the Confederate lines of battle.

The

and Gilmer from Hardee • s command .

famous " council

I:n addition, there were several

staf'i' officers and other officers present. 28
Be cause macy of the troops had used up their rations , and much

noise had been made on
held t..�e advantage of

tlle m.arch, Beaure gard

surprise .

thought they no longer

He recommended th at the 3..."'4
. V be wi thdra1m

55
to Corinth ,.

the views of the various ofii cers 1

After listeninr, to

at da._yliE;ht t..'h.c following

Johnston announced his decision to attack

:a:t;a:;, he

remarked to

a million.
tr: a.n.

we

They

a

staff of.ricer , " 1 woulC:

can prese nt no gz'C o.t-er front between these t-#o creel\8

can ; and t!1e more n-en

tllilm it for tl"Jem. n29
Vihen

they crowd in there 1 ·::.he 1•0rso -we can

Th.u.a 1 t.:te

stage

was

se t .rar tLe Bat·;:.lo of Shiloh .

·t.he Confederates a:tta.cbed t.he i'ollov1ing morning, "Lbcy did

r.ct know t.hc exact location of the
vras

fi[:l1t tl:e:m. if they were

Fo(l.era.l

be tlroen :aa.r ooe 1 s advancing line anc:

an

lims .

The f:irst

clash

early raornine reconn=li s sance

party sent out by one of Prentiss 1 bric;ade c on':::1ander� .

l�f'tar a brief

skirmish 1 the Federals retired., and U•e Confederate line STie:;;t
·the ca;'nps of P.rentiss • Sixth
possession of the out.ire

Division.

By 8 :00 A. ;,,r. . , they

into

l'lere

in

camp .30

3/iuch has been writ·i.;en and s aid about tho extent to whic..'"l the
i''e cicrals were surprised in that ;;:· irst

gvide nces of surpr ise

were

or...slaught ..

Various

quite eviG.e:nt. in the corr.,.,J. t� on in v:ilich tlJe

att.ac�::ers fou11d the cam�;s and in t;:1e ;,ta:.'1Ill3 r in \Wdch. the

roo t .

COi.L:anders

From all the se it nus·i;, rJO

assu.rned that

attacl�:

was

tbe Federals ·were not
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ex_r.>e cting

an

attack of

a

t;eneral r...aturo • .3l

F.J.sawhere ; the :F'edcral.s put up

a

a

l':!Ore determined

di:f'.':.'ic-J:lt ravim vd.t1-.:. his headquarters

first noise of

battle , this divisior..

was

at

res.�.stance .

Shilo1: Cl1.u rch.

IiBarinc the

pos ted a.long this ridge in

position to have a [:;ood line of fire at the Ccmfcderates as t;.�ey crossed
the ravine , althou.gil tlJO thickets there afforded the Coni'ederate s so;�:.e
pro te ction ..

Prentiss 1

111e .first ass au.lt against this p os ition

repulsed_, but

re't:.J."<.;; ut left Sh.erman1 s left, flank unprote ct�d, and he was

forced to fall back • .32

Beaure gard m.acl.e Shiloh Cr.�Urch his headquarters

.following tlJe Confederate

occu : ation of Sh.errna.n • s camps , ace:., thus1 the

small. log structure served t-r:o opposi.ng a.r·::des

points

wa:;;

at the s ame

31Th.is

is

tir:e .3.3

one

lhis

was a.

as

l1ead.qu.a:t· eo:ts

tactic born of

:cc cesGity

on

as

·the

tile

of' the great c ontrov-ers ial is�; ,le s of the battle .

However1 half eaten braaktasts were found in Prentiss 1 camps , half
d:ressed prisoners 1rrere -t:.a.!.ren 1 and tr1e Federals organized no effe ctive
in the vicinity of these camps .
Johnston, Mf!. ,2! Johnston, 574-591•
.32Sherman,

--�·

il.lfemoirs , I,

33ara.nt, Memoirs , I,

236.

.365.
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broken and wooded character of UlC

field1

interspersed with a .few

clea.ring;s and C'tlltivated plots 1 resi sted the formation of a:rr:r stable
Federal defense line •

Thus 1 t!e Confederates were se ldom able to

bring pressure upon the entire line at once 1 as while p art of the
was

line

Federal

s table 1 it

mi;;;:ht be fluctuating in another sector.

Although the Confederate attacks had

a demoralizing effect on the

soldiers in line 1 t'bey did not have the effect on the entire ariJ\Y' which
a. more concerte d and &reneral attack might have

Soon

had.

after the apening of the battle 1 mos t of the Federal troops

in the field were e ngaged,..

McClerna.nd. re-e n:forced Sherman's le ft ,

w. H. L. Wa.llaee moved into the center in support of Prentiss , and

Grant wa.s

Hurlbut 's division formed on Prentiss ' left.
fast at

his headquarters in Savannah

e ating break-

when he heard the first roar o£

cannons announcing the opening of the

battle .

He imme diately boarded

a dispatch boat and set off ups tream, stopping at Crump ' s only long
enough to or der I4w Ytallaoe to hold his troops in readiness .

Soon

after &"'''iving on the field1 Grant se nt orders to Wallace to mow at

once to join the r'ederal
be discussed

mo:t-e fulJy in

Between

as

l'flzy- th.is

movement was delayed will

con<·1ection with other re-enforcements . ·

lO cOO A. M. and noon, th.e Confederate advance received

its first serious

ma.in:cy" much

right.34

check.

Heretofore , the � had mowd forward

the result of the local charges, but the Federal lett

and ce nter were finally able to effe ct a uniform

34uorn1

� .2£

Tenmssee,

131.

lim .

Wallace 1s and

.58
Hurlbut • s divisions 1 alone with the remnants of Prentis s ' shattered
for ce , had found a natural
Along the

which,

as

lire on which

crest of a ridge there

·t.o ralJ.y.

was

an

old1 abandoned road

is comrJ.on with dirt roads , had been worn and washed ot1t until

it formed a natural

rifle

p1t.3.5

In following the ridge, it ran

cGnvex

to the attacld.ng Confederates , therefore , m.alcint;; it diL icult to out
flank.

The road 114Ui lone s .Lnce been abandoned, and underbursh had

covered its s ides , providing even mo:t-e pro te ction for the defenders .36
This position was located about t."Jree-fottrths of a mile to the rear of
Prentiss ' ea.w.ps in the center and left of the e ntire l"ederal lire and
jus t east of the junction of the Hamburg and Savannah and Hamburg and

FUrey Roads .

In front

of the

old road, ran a picket fence which pro

vided additior.al infant:cy' cover.

Hore over , there were logs and other

defc.mses has tily prepared by the l''e deral.s .
road the i'ederal

l"rom the depression of this

infantry could pour a devastating fire upon

wi th very little da.nt.-er of exposing themselves .

available artillery

was

at·tacker

In additi on, all the

posted irmnediately behind

add to this weltering f:l.re .

an

the road in order to

It was "shorter, stronger., compacter, and

more continuous " tJ:1an the first Federal line • .37

Contributing to the s trength of this pos ition,
.front, over which the Confederates had to a'ttacl::,

36nukD,

History_£,£ Morca.n.• s Ca.v�,

37 Johnston, Y£.2. !?£.

Johnston,

147 .

600-6o6 .

was

tJ1e ground in
ideal. for defense .
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Along the right front, a large open plot k:novm
awa:r from the

line .

In

the center

was a se ction

which helped prevent organized, massed attack.
anotb.er field of' c onsiderable size
to D-tncan

Ficld)8

Federal left

was a

Duncan Field

as

slopinf; flJli<Irl

sloped

of' vvood.ed undergrowth

Qn the left front

was

in a. s imil..:.'.r mar:u:er

In part of this field il:>taediatel;r before tl1e

smi?J.l peach orci�ard and h:! hind

a

this

black-jack trees , in which there was a small pond.

t..1rlc ket of

Here tvro batterie s

of Federal artillery wro pla.cod, one in the peach orchard and w..e in

the

thickat.39

In the

de.ferse alonG t.lJ.is line , 1'� . H . L. litallace com-

manded the right, .furlbut the left, and n.�entiss the ce rJ:.cr .
;\!1en the Confederates first came on this position, tl�y attempted
to tal:B it in the s ame lTh'lil.rJI:Ie r in which they had for ce d all the previous

Federal positions , by localized attack.

At firs t,

a.

brigade charged

t..'w position without success and. wi th dreadful casualties .
the

a.dva."'l:Cine Confederates came

1'hen1

upon the position in greater rumbers ,

larger detachments were hurled across the fields and thicl<et.
after d1arge

was

as

Charge

made , s ane of thorn reaching the natural rifle pit which

he.s come to be calle d tiw '*Old Sunken Road , " hut the results were the
s a.::-.s 1 a.11d tbe Confederates suffered terrible losses .

flying so thick th at the Ccm!ederatos ga;ve the

area

'I'he bulle ts were
tbe

l:'lame

"Hornet •s

38Descriptive information gathered from the restored area of
Shiloh National Military Park by field trip1 Harch1 1953 •
.39John Allan Wyeth1 Life of General 1-Iatha.n Bedford Forrest
Harpe r, 1899 ) 1 rr;:- Th'iS pond.' \Vas ca!le<i "Bloocyo Poiiin
because it ia said that the wounded o.f both armies drank there until

(New York :

their blood tttrned its color red.

Action continued in this sector for

than four hours , and the

position until they had turood both the

Confederates di d not truce the

l7ederaJ. right a.l'ld

l'llOl"El

Sherman

J.B £t .flanks •

Tvas

slmvJ..y forced back on the

Federal right until the Confederates were virtualzy in the rear of the
11Hormt • s Nest. "

S:imilarly1 the

F'eder;:J,. le ft woo turmd by repeated

assaults in that se cto:r.
After personal.l;r leading a succes sful charge a.ga:i.:rJD t the Federal

ri�Jlt 1 Johnston
a

was

struck by a chance shot and died from

few moments later .

loss of

blood

Undoubtedly, he embodied tba s pirit of: the Con

federate attack, and his loss

was

sorely felt.

Beauregard a66Ul'I!Gd- the direction of t.i:-.18
Meanwhile.; Brigadie r

As second in

command1

a.:rnw.4l

Gemral Daniel Rugr;les , commandi ng Bragg t s

F'irst Divls ion1 had gathered all the available artillery and placed it

opposite the E'ederal position on the " Old Sunken Road. "

ln all, twelve

batteries were formed in a single line from wilich they poured a devas tat

ing fire into the l"edera.J.s .42

By four or fiw o ' clock, the Federals had

been fia.nJged to such an extent that they
.fighting back to back.

ware

virtually surrounded am

Realizing the dangEtr of capture , w.. n. L.

Wallace s ought to re t:l:re his forces tartard

the landing.

In retreating

down a shallow ravine 1 t.hey were caught in a murderous cross-fi:re in

40Johnston, � 2£.

Johnston,

60,3-606.

4libid.
, 61)-616.
42o.t£1cial

Records , Series I, Vol. 10,

472.
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which Wallace

was mortally' wounded.

his divis ion es caped ca.ptnre .h.3
left,

as

he wa.s

Ho·wever � much of the remnants o£

Hurlout als o ret:tred on

continuall,y ol.:ttflanlrod.L4

of I:is d:i.vision .

This

was

abo<.t t

5 ;JO

Federal.

Prent::.Ss in the center

Th is

i.l:L>Jline nt., he ordered the troops to cut their w<r.r cru t .

its complete destruction, he sur endered

the

was

not

v;i th 2200 men, th.e re;::tail.'loor

P . M.,

45

The !!'ederal line along the abandone d road held from 10 :00
until almost

fedel"ate

6.aOO P. 1-A:.

1heae

eight hou:ns completeJ.¥"

att..enrpts to turn the Federal left.

carried three hours e arlie r 1 the

the 'l'e nnessee .

road1 follov.-lng the lew

A -. !J.

thwarted the Can-

Had thi s position boen

Confede1•ates probably v1ould have

the e ntire field and ei·tber killed or captured Oil"et'y

il:r::ey of

was

ul&'l

won

in the Federal

TJa.erc can bo litU.e doubt bat th.is one vre .:�thered

ridge 1 provide d tho Federals with their raos t

successful position in the battle .

It

Via.s

tb.::: lrey to tho cc,:n.flict..

The

fact that it .beld ou·t s o lone gave k:em time to arrar;ge a.nothc.:: r lire .
'l'his tJ1e-,r did., and from behind i t they waited

th� re-erlforce::n.ents

with it

which

for :.nieht to a.rrh"e and

turned the tide of battle tho follow-

ing datr·
Late in the afternoon

43Ibid., ' 149
44ro::td. , 203-2o4.
4511
�. · .I 279
•

•

of the sixth., Colonel J . D,. Webster of

Grant ' s staff arranged
This

or up the river .

last

for their

a long and
Viith

S l">lre
was

It

stand.

deep

the lim on \'.1lich the Federal forces ra�lied

the ra.vine ,.46

on the crest of a bluff which overlooked

was

ravi110 knol'm

the Tenmssee at a

depth in

twenty-odd pieces of artillery facing s outh

Dill Branch, which ope red into t.b.e

as

high stage, there was water
The line follawe d �t.he

road almost due west. from the river, until
to

CI"Ul:<1p •s I..aJ.:.dir.g.

Jrrcy of the Teru"Wssee
..

it intersected the River Road

Along this JJ...ne , the

::lade in force is
was

to the Confederates is a q-.1es t.ion which

a matter of history.

o.xha.ustod1 chose to

or not a final surge rrould. have

only attem,pt at

and Corinth

prepared to meet the dey ' s final attack.

l?eauregard1 re alizir.g that his a.rmy

The

Pittsburg

brid£:,'6 over Snake Creek.47

Tli.at this a.tt,ack was x.evcr

1�he tl-.!el"

to a cor...s idera.ble

'l'here the line turr:ed north along the latter road

and stretche d to i:J1e

fight.

river.

brought corrple te victory

probably Tdll

attack on this . lir.e was

ne\;·er

be iJJ1S'W'ered.

nrade by the b1·igades of

�iga.dier Generals Chalmers and Jackson of Braa:; 1 s c orps .
gades on tbe extreme Con.fedel·ate

stop the

'l'hese bri-

right attempted to c harge this line .,

1-'ind:ing the fi.re from the art:i.llery very i ntense and being unable to
advance

the 1va.ters a..'U up the

across

steep banks of' Dill Branch� they

.fell back and received £rom Beaaregcu•d the c:rder to retire •
tJ:te battle

on

S\llldatr .1�8

46ora.nt.,
47o. R.

Memoirs, I1

At�� �

48ofi'icial

.34.5.

I, Plate

l2 .

Re cords, Series

I, Vol.

10,

547-556.
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As alrea.d¥ mentioned, Grant sent orders on Sund� morning for lew

to

lJ1allace
as

move

possible .

his divis ion on the field .from Crump •s Le.ndi ng as

This order rea.cood him at

ll a.)O

A . M.

fast

O.f the two roads to

the area of the battle 1 he selected the westernmos t, which woold bring
him

on

tl-e field on the right of 6'he rman 1 s camps at a distance of s ix
As he neared Sn&lre Creek, he learned the Federals had been

miles .

beaten back and his present coarse would

bring him up

in the re ar o:£

the Confederate s , thu.s cu·tting him off from the rest of tm �.

He

immediately

countermarched almost tc his original point of departu.re ,

turned back

on

t.he more easterly River Road which followed a

ing route , and crossed Snalm Creek

"fr8.S

aboat the s ame .

the field, it

tirely

a.

wae

By the

atter nightfall.

to the topography",

49

the lack

of it marshy from. the high

time he could bring his division

of

more

definite orders 1

as

divis ion

ani the

was

Buell •s ll.rr!q of the Cllio also .figured prominently in

left

on

The dela;r may be attributed en

condition of the roads , and not to Wallace • s negligence

He , personally 1 had

wind

good bridge near Pittsburg

The distance to be covered, much

Landing.

waters,

by

more

charged

the battle .

Colnmbia., Tennessee 1 on April 3 w:Lth the

on his march from Nashville to

j oin

Qrant at

rear

Pittsburg Landing.

He arrived in Sava.•ma.h on the fifth, the same dq on which his advanced

division arri ved.
intervals .

The other five divisions were marching at six-mile

Hearing the s ounds of battle

on the morning

of ths

sixth,

he ordered all his divisions to leave their

.fast as possible .

baggage and push forward

as

He tLe n set out with his one divis ion from Savannah

ups tream to Pittsburg r�a.ndinc: follov.'ing the east bank of the s tream.

Finding tho

r oads impracticable for artiller-.r ,

behind to be forwarded to the battlefield
Ylas

he ordered the guns left

by stean�r .

The one division

ferried acros s the river just at nig7l.tfal.l, part of them arriving

in time for the repulse

of the previously rJantioned last assault.

By

the follawine morning, four of his s ix divisions had been placed in
position on the field.50
Dtlrin£j the nid;l t the ttvo Feder.:ll gunboats 1 the

�xii?ffitop,

and the

fired shells at regular interva.ls into the area where the

Confederates
began to

Tyler

were

fall .

bivouacked.5l

Als o, about midnic;ht a drenching rain

Partially be cause of the shells from the b"il.nboata and

partially in order to find shelter from th.e rain_. the Confederates
retired to the

tents of the abandoned

.Federal

ca.'nps during the ni@1t

and, thus allowed the F'ederals to re-occupy cor:nanding pos i tio:rus so
dearly "WOn in tJ1e da\v''s battle .52

Wa.l.lace brought from .f'lve to e i ght

thousand JJ)9n on the field

tr1at

nicht1 and Buell ' s four divisions &'llounted to more than 201000 men.

By

morning the l�'edera.ls had almost 301000 fresh troops with ·which to a.ssttn¥:l

50lbid. , 291-292 .

5lnonald Davidson, The Tenoo s se e , � New River, Civil !"!:: !2,
TVA (Rivers o£ America SerieS ed. by R'ervey Men and Car! r!armer1
l1ei York: Rrnehari, !9IiS), Y� .
52 John6ton1

!!!:£! .2f. Johnston, 639...642 .
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offe n.s�lve operations , exclusive of those involved in tho first da.Y ' e

oppose these 1 the Confe derates CO".lld wster

..... t •
J. ..L.. t,f""

,('.;

To

if that

mruw.5.3

the second

scant 201000_,

T'nis comparti..s on of forces is tho l:.ey to the battle on

da\r.

orates put up

a

There was :re ally never a contest,

a.

very s tiff fight.

they le ft, the field in an

orderly·

although the Con£ed...

They vrera steadi.l,y pushed back, until
retroat in

mid-a.fter:r.oon.

The J!'ederals

rn.ade no attempt to !ollaw1 althouGh Bre ckinridge was left with his

conxna.nd to act
Both

as

a rear

gua.rd.54

s ides claime d vi ctory at Shiloh.

Certainly it was one ot

tl:e hardest fought a:nd bloodiest battles of all time .

who we nt into

0£

401.335 men

battle the total casu alties for tr�e Confederates in kUled1

wounded, and miss ing wore reported by· Beauregard as

casualtie s of' the Federals

were

lis ted as

13,047 .

101694 .55
•

Sirflila:r

'l"heir forces had

num

bered approximately 6o.,OOO including the A:rrr.r:t of the Ohio ax1d tlJ:)
division at Crw:1p • s Lar.td:Lng.
on

da:y numbered

the morr..int; of the first

a.t"'l'rtf would adm::i. t defeat, it
that it v.rould talre

more

Union jug£,rerneut.

In

Tlw 11'o d.eral forces e nc:;u:Ipcd

Vliil!l

now

371.331. 56 Although

-

field

nei tJ1)r

than Soutr..crn fire and patriotism to defeat th�

addi tion# the :Federals found. their e r:emies to be

637-642 .

54otficial

the

evident, if it had not been before ,

possest:>-ed of the qualities which predicted a. lor...g and

53Ibid. ,

on

Records ,

55Ibid. , 395-396.
-

serie s I, Vol.

10, 388.

blooey war.
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Irl 1:1arzy- re.spects ti·:e Battle of Shiloh was

'l'his p1·oved to be a costly error as they l'IDJ:'e unable to de

cisively de:f'eat

the

.F'ederals before they

were re-enforced..

to this late arrival was the terrible condition
acros ��'

Shiloh.

the ridt:,-es and throa.gh the

swamps and

Y:hen they did arrive the Federals

tbey had evex-y opp ortunity to discover the

of the

Contributing

r oads leading

marshe s between

were

Corinth and

surprised although

Confederates as t:hey advanced.

'l'he mam:Jer in which tba Confe derates were organized and ·t.he
spaced fields and thiclrets of the

r.:tgs,ed terrain of the

vented their attackinG in concerted
of sepm·ate a-ctions alone
as

more

The Confederates arr ive d on the fie ld a dey later than

poorly exe cuted..
they pla.nred.

poorly planned and

it was on a low

a

s ingle line •

battlefield pre

'Ihus the battle

waves .

inter

'Ihe ttQJ.J Sunken

'I'EtS

a series

Road, " located

ridge fa.cii:tG ini:erspa.ced open field� a..nd

oonse

thic ke ts , provided the l:'ederals Yd.th tho :r:e cess ary advantacc ·t'ith

which

to check the Confedera:te advance lox1g enough

to prove nt the�n from. fol

lo\·:ing th.eir plans to turn th3 i''ederal fJ.ank.,

Dill Branch , with its

steep banks filled wi th

backwater

from tho river , provided an

:i:Jl'Ipassabla

bar-.rior behind which too li'edera.ls fo rme d the ir last lire on April 6 .

!'his lilJ;:; kept the Confederates from. taking Pittsburg Lancli l1[; J hence 1he
Federals -oore ablo to land re-en.forcer:re nts '\\<'h ich gave tbem tl::e victory

the following dq.

CHAPTER IV

Trm

EVACUA1'ION 01" COEHl'l"fl

Villen the Confederates retre ated. from the field at Shiloh, they

were a tired and spent a.rn:zy-.

Sinlilarly, tile .Fede rals did not i�a.ve

the s trength to pursue their advantage .

7

had lef't both the Confederate Arley of 1\f.ississip1)i a.nd

.A.rnzy- of t.he Tennessee
was
a.

The casualties

not true

part

on

of April 6 al'ld
the federal

unable to contitlUe any s ort of a. campaign.

of t.he r e cently

This

arrived Ar1rzy- of the Ohio under tl1e ll .

Only

of the latter reached the scene of action in time for the fighting

Aprl.l 7 .

'Ihis

entire

victorious force , e a�::e r

arnzy� was soon bro-.1ght up ; it w as a vigorous 1

to do battle with the crippled Confederates .

the :iPederals could ! Ha·ve follo-11red tL.em to Corinth and maneuvered them
into a. battle tl�.ere it'lln.e diately after Shiloh , it is poss ible t11at the
Confedera:te cause :Ln the west would have been lost .
released men to tbe e as tern theater , result,ing

This would have

in conditi ons sir.1ilar

to those surroundin;; the capitulation of the Confederacy following tl1e

loss of the west in 1864.

Ho1vever, the Federals vrere unable to strike

this blow ::,ecause of a series of occurrences .
In order to :re acl1 Pittsburg Landi ng in

time to

save the Arrfr:l

of the 'l'ennassee 1 !bell ' s men had made forced rna.rches .

terrain and poor roads e as t of

'l'he ru.g: >ed

the TenMssee ld.ver had caused them

to le ave their supp� trai ns and artille ry behind.

1'hu.s

on

the

night

of April 71 with the Confederates retreating toward the comparative
safety of Corinth , t.he ArllU of tl.Je Ohio found itself without rations

If
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a:nd low on a.ramunition; they were unable to pursue •

hence , the Confed

erates were able to retire with much of the ir sup ;Jlie s . l
111e heavy

seasonal

r ai ns made roads

impassable and l'va.sbe d awaysup:;).;}- trains could

It was several d<.WS before pa:rt of the

bridees .

be brousht UlJ and fe rried a.crcs a the river and even weeks be.fore tl1ey

all arrive d.

.By t:·.: is tiDle , it

cautious sier;c oi Corinth.

wa::;

: !ad the:r boen able to brine up the ::l.l" supplies

they still could not have m.a.rctad
on Corinth

e r.tea.mped

on

at once

too late for aJ·x;rthinc o the r· ii'lan a

in::-:ediately.

ln orc:Cr to have advar.oed

tbey t�ould :1ave Lecn forced to ccns tru ct britiges

-t.he high croun6 of tl1e rc ce::1t bat tle -fi(l ld..

l'inoJ.ly on

llilif 2, the river ooe;m1 to re cede . 2
lio anwhile , Halleck .ru:·:ri vc d at ?.i ttsbux·g Lar"Ji ng on
ar..d as::>l!�ncd active cor::.;.::.and in

tb.e :field., J

from variol.l.S quax·ters to bolster the
had evacuated New

.1\pril ll

h.e ...e r.forceuents t:u·z ·ived

F'aderal m·rrzy- .

Tl:e �!oni'ederates

:O.:adr:Lct,

13_, re:tir ir�; to Island Hwil.bor Ten and the 'fEl ri.essce side of tl:e river .

so

ttat. l::e e ncircled the Confedera:tes tterc , and

lotficia.l Records,

Series I, Vol. 10,

.3Grant, Memoirs 1 I,

.371.
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isla11d to

shambles .

On April 7 1

the island waa surrendered alone;

tl:.e second

with

s ome

ruw of the

7000

Battle of Shiloh,

n1e Federals

:nen .

there were then free to re-e nforce their comrades at Pittsburg

This they did, arrivinr, on

April 21.

had 120, 000 me n assembled in

To

La.r1ding.4

By the first of ; :rey , the Federals

the vicinity of Pittsburg La.r:.ding.5

oppose tl1is force 1 !Jea.ure gard had ro"t.lghly

50,000

troops .

Those were the ve terans of Shiloh , some Miss issi;)})i and Alaba.:':'la regi-

ments

which

had been reeruited,

and

an

arnzy' from Arkansas 1 veterans of

the Ba.tt.le of Pea Ridge 1 under General Sterline Price and General
Van Dorn.
da.fense .

�'fith

these troops ,

A new line

was

in front of the town.

Corinth vras

placed in

of a wooded marsh from the

Mobile

followed

the

northeast,

a low ridge to the rear

and Ohio Railroad on the left to

the Memphis and Charleston Ha.ilroad on the right.6
ran

a .fair s tate of

laid out about three miles to

In general., it

Earl

Two cree ks , which

through low and heavily wooded bottoms 1 paralleled tl:.te front o£

the Confederate lines .

In order to

assail

the

lines 1 these difficult

The lines themselves

bottoms wcr..1ld have to be crossed.

were mere

ri.fle pits along the crest of the r idge with batteries of artillery
posted in protected places to e onrna.nd the roads from tho front. 7
I•'rom the position of the Federal center -r1here they encamped ne ar

UHorn, � !?£ 'lfmne����, :1.44-:145 .
5arant1 Memoirs , I1 371-376.
6x1orn1 � !?£ Tennessee, 145.
7 Q£ficial Records,

Series

I, Vol . 10, 7 75.
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Pitts'rurg r.anding, two roads led towards Corinth1

approaci1int; from the

'111-esa liere tho Iiidge Road and tl1e dire ct road over which

nortl1-east,

the Con.f"ederates had mcved to the Battle of Shiloh, 8

Corinth road

le avinc Honterey passed into tr.e Purcy and

andJ

thus , approached Corinth .from the north ,

Corinth with Hamburg, where Pope t s .a.:rnzyall narrow, unim;proved dirt roads .
Landing

was

was

to t.'ie '\'est

Two roads connected

e ncamped,

The

roads

were

The direct road .from Pittsburg

crossed by several small

stre&'1S ,

were Chamoora Creek and Seven tile creek,
!rom the

CJthor roads

The l argest of these

The former

Confederate worlcs , and the latter

was

was

six miles

only three ,

'l'hese creeks

could not be crossed wj.thout bridges , which had to be co1wtructed as the

a:rmy advanced. 9
The land between Pi ttsburg Landine and
high hills occurrine s ometi 1e s alone

pa:rt

the larger s treams ,

The

greater

of this area. was c overed v.1.th forests , w ith intervening cle arings

around houses and settlements •

Scrub growth was very thick and

impassable in the lOW O'OUOO Cut thinned
ridges . 10

the

Corinth is rolling, with

IY.l t

considerably

along tJ.te

HaJ.J.eck mentions several times in his reports the

CO'J.ntry

was

thiclcy wooded and

After the retre at

from the

8Chapter III, page

90£ficial.

lOora.nt,

field

at Shiloh•

Recor ds, Series I, Vol. 101
'

l.lotficial

fact that

marshy.n

673 .

.37.3.

Records, Series I, Vol . 10.,

tm Confederates

I·

48.

Memoirs , I,

virtuall.y

666.
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took

position on Pea

and Corinth .
approaches

Hidge near Monterey 1 hall'way

This ridge

was

between the

long, although not hiGh 1 and
F'rom here , brisk

a cros s Lick Creek.l2

comrnanded ttJS

recon.r:taiss a.nces were

mlil.da 1 until the li;ederals ooga.n their a.dvance toward Corinth .
time 1 the C onfederates 'began retiring,

toward

they

as

forced

ware

incapacitated Grant by removir..g him from colm:iand of the

slowly back

vlrtual:cy'

Arnv of the

':l.'e r.JEssec and makine him se cond in command with nothing to do .
along with many others , was

not

at all pleased

with

before and during the Battle of Shiloh .

There

Gra.'"lt had

measure s

not tal'.en proper precau tionary
'l'here was also a feeling of

two generaJ..s .l3

The Ii'ederal. farces

for the march on Corinth .
o:t the

At this

their works at Corinth .

V'�be n Halle ck took co.rrrnand at Pittsburg Lm1ding, he

attack.

landing

adva.noe .

Buell ' s

on

prof!�ssions.l jealousy between the

were

organized into three armies

Army of tl:e <hio formed tr.e center

tl1.e left.

Thomas was taken from Buell ' s co:-runand and

of' the Tennessee on the ri {#lt.l4

153 .

l3Grant1

�<femoirs, I,

l4ot:ticial Records ,
15Ibid.,
-

665 .

M.ajor

nar�ed the Arnzy-

Gereral. George H.

placed in

They did not

370.
Series

was

ch:nr�e oi' the Army

The main elements of tile

force began th:eir advance on M.ay 4.15

l2 Ibid. ,

s:.1spicion that

agains t a surprise

The nawly arrived force under Pope

of the Mis s is s ippi and placed

-

Grant ' s actions

the

was

.Halleck,

I, Vol. 10, 672 .

Federal

COlll[:>le tely invest
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the

Confederate works until Mey- 28 � 16

to march the a..""1P.y over a

distance

T�Jus, twenty-four day-s

talcen

were

of less than nine teen .m::.l.es .

This is expla:l.ned by the cautious a.pl'roach used

by

Ealle ck.

In

tl:te advance the Federals used all the pro cfllltions of s ic�-e v;arfare .
add.i. tion to the
p oor

difficulty of travel

roads , the Fecbrals

advanced.,

Shiloh and

ordered to entr€mch e ach

v1ere

right constructed

Corinth •

sevon

before Corinth end in

Uea.nwhile 1 v:ithin the

position

they

as

Shc:rma.:tl • s division

distinct entrencbrJ d ca.»tps 1xlt\1een

He seems to think tJ1at

for his inexperience d troops .J.B
YiaB

the irrcr;ular terrc�in .:iJ.nd

1'his �:nade the move1oo nt extremely slow. 17

on ·the extreroo

a:rrrry

over

In

Finally ,

this

on

was

valuable

training

U.a:g- 29, the cn·tire redera.l

close contact with the Confederate lines . 19

Confederate lines all was

not well.

They

had evacuated almost all their wounded from Shiloh, and the small town
of Corinth wae unable to s uccessfully house
call

was

and treat them.

made for doctors from the surrounding area.

women left their homes to eon:e to Corinth a.nd care

'l'he town, situated

on

low ground, did not have an

1.\'a.ny Confederate

for the wounded.
adequate water supply.

Soon tl:;e welle beca:.w contaminated, restL, ti.ng in an epidemic
fever.

Ill ad',Lition1 there

w:.l.V a.11

l7 o. n.

Ile moirs ,
r

{�.tlaa,

18 off"lcial
...!..,
�" 1
19UJ:•a.�

'

13.

Ite cords1 Scr�.e s I, Vol .

H
.; ..,.. s,
:;eme ....
..

I,

..,79 •
:>

typhoid

Soon t:be aili:U."; troops1

I1 3 79.

r, Plate

of'

epidemic of measle s , and trouble with

SU.Pi1lios brought on malmtr1.tion and hu:r..ger .

l6crant1

An urgent

101 7�.

7:3
o:f 1rhich aho'.1.t
Corinth

$000

of

Shiloh,

be cm."'le ono large hos:;1i tal ··;n�.rd.

used to hcr<.1se the se
sult

had been wounded at

<?..nd these

raen.,

\\"Bre

these eondi tiona ru1d the vas tl.y

�'very

nttmoo :t-e cl around

available 1:.uilcling

<>ften inadeouate , 20
.

the works ,

.

a re..

on

J\!�r 26,

The

completed on Yo.[)(! 291 the cley oofore the Federals entered
The Confederates wor<� able to remove almos t all their

and supplies southward alone the 1Eobile and

which m.i::.;ht have ended the

war

'l'he �attle

in the west and great:cy haste :red the

defeat of the Confederacy was not
terrain, and poor

fought.

Poor roads 1 excessive rai.l'W,

leadership combi:ned with a laclc of knowledge

of the 'l'ihoreabouts of the Confederate troops corrtribu ted to the
of 'the T"ederals in following their
ot.he r hand1

men

Ohio Railro ad, 2l

Thus thero was no decisive e nc;agement at Corinth .

difficult

As

was

superior :;,;'ederal force approach-

ill.g his .f'ront1 Be aure gard begm1 to evacuate Corinth
movement was

181000,

advantagG gained at Shiloh.

·Lhe location of Corinth, the

poor

slowr.e ss

On the

water sup.:;ly1 a.."'ld the

;;eneraJ. lt:rt..�e aJ.thfulnoas of . tb.e Cor.J.'edera.te a.rm;r

Ca!.lSCd it to 1Tlthd.rm'l

rather than r:uakt� a s tand.
'!'he
ce ntral

lor.:s of Corintl1 forced the Confederates

Missies :i.ppi .

to tl:e l''e dera.ls •

'lbey

rivers adjacent to it.

20Horn1

Vich:abur:.:; be came the

now

most

back o n a

lim a.cr oo s

important Co:nf'odera.te

controlled. all o.f Ylest Te nnessee and the

'I'hey als o dominated the li.emphis and Charles ton

k� 2£ T�rl!YiH'H:Jee, 148-1.49 .

2lofficial. Hecor ds .. Series I, Vol. 10,

762 -764 .
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Railroad, the mos t v-ltal conl.'nunicati ons artery in the Confederate west.
This provided the Federals with bases
and Alabama.

from

which to invade Mississippi

The Confederates were never able to drive the Federals

from West Tennessee and again occupy that region.

From here the s cene

shifted to Middle Tenne ssee and Co.nfederate ef'f<r ts to :retake their
lost territor:r there .

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIOO
'l'hroughout the c:cr
c npai gns in Vtest TenrJessee , the conditions of

the topography played a very promir.t:mt role .

The Civil ffar

was

a con

flict in \vhich com..'nunications were extremely poor in tel"'r!!S of present

d.q warfare .

In the beginning , the Confederates

tf.te bunks of t he
..

their de.f'er...se .

Ohio

were

unable to occupy

River as a natural line along Ythich to form.

Inabillty to occupy tt.J.s line also cost them control

of the Cumberland and Te nnesc>Ge Hivers at their mouths on the Chio.
These riwrs forl:!l3 d the fatal pa.tlnv� used bvJ the :fl"ederals to invade
the heart of Tennessee .

In providing a defense against thl;l Federal invasions along these
water co-11rses 1 very poor judgment was used in the sele etior£ of the site
of Fort Henry.

Its location subjected it to effective attack .from both

land troops and g11nboa:ts .

The high water, which almos t surrounded the

fort a.t the time of ·the attack, made communication slot.' and the entire
position difficult to defe rrl.

l1'ort Donelson, situated in a mch more

a.dvantage<rlls locality, was neverthe less handicappe d by topography which

denied the u se of any avenue o:f escape .

valuable manpower to tl:e Confederacy.

This resulted

The

in the

loss of

fort and its outworks were

strong for a defens ive posi tion1 .for the rid[.res provided its garr ison

Tlth

a.n

excellent line of fire

on

a.n a.ttacldng foe .

It is si gnificant

that, unlike Fort Henry, the e levated river defenses on the bluff a.t
Donelson euccess.t'ully repulsed the Federal gunboats .

!.fore over 1

the only

76
part of the outer

works 'Mlich were taken by direct assault

ware

completed a."ld underraanned rine pits on the eJ>rtreme ri ght .
led to th.e surrender of the fort..

tl'e in

This , however ,

It may be assumed that with be tter

pla."1l'led and more complete construction, Fort Donelson might have pre...

sented

a.

more serious obs tacle to the :Federal advance .

Ar;ain1 topography was

a prominent factor in the late arrival of

the Confederates in line of battle at Shiloh.

Poor

roads and marshy'

ravlne bottoms caused the arnzy- to delay its attack a whole da;y, when time
v.·as mos t pre cious .

The rains of the season turned the soft clay soU

of the rolling hills into a quagmire and prevented the various detach

me nts from follavdng the ir s chedule .

..tUso, the z;olateau remnant 'Which

formd the battlefield at Shiloh provided tbe Federal. army wit.� a s trong
natural position.

The interspaced

woods and fields 1 cut by ravires

filled with undergrowth, gave the Federals points on

which

to ral.ly;

this s ame irregularity of terrain

prevented the Confederates

attack:i.ng in concerted s tref'.gth.

The

slightly elevated pos ition

"Old Sunken Roacl11 and th.e dii'.f.ieult,r of
the Federals riith

e.

from

ass au lt

from its front

of the

provided

natu.ra.l i'artification v.1:11ch actually saved the

dzW

for them.
'1.'he rugeed

terrain

east of the Te nnessee River

in

Hardin County

caused the A:rrrq of the Ohio to leave its supplies and artillery behind

in order to �t to too field at Shiloh.

&.ell is

In turn , this prevented

f:resh troops f:rom malting w"l effective pursuit of the Confederates ,

as they retreated toward Corinth .

Slowness in

bringing up the supply

trains , couple d with the di!ficultv of the r oads through
bottoms

between

the marshy

Pittsburg Landing and Corinth" and the timidness wi tll

77
which the l"ederals advanced, c�used the delq which a.lloved the

erates to s-uccessfully evacuate

Corinth.

of Corinth itself on low

sur: ounded

grotmd

finally1 the

Confed

actual location

by marshes and creeks con

trj.buted to the he alth protlems of the Confederate ari!I'J to such an

extent that it

was

forced

Federals were able to
of

much of the

to malre t11at evacuation.

occupy all of

As a result the

west Tennessee � exercise control

Miss issippi and Tennessee Rivers , occupy and hold fue

Memphis and Charleston

Railroad, and launch the offensive vmich

eventually split the South with the capture of New Orleans by Federal
forces .
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